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Major Professor: Randall P. Ellis, Professor of Economics 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation analyzes the role of information, cost-sharing, and payment 
reforms in health care markets. The first chapter analyzes the impact on total medical 
costs of using a risk-adjusted comprehensive payment model, to support a patient-
centered medical home. We compare insurance claims data on treatment and control 
practices from a network health plan in upstate New York. Practices in the treatment 
group embraced a risk-based comprehensive payment model, receiving risk-adjusted base 
payments and bonuses, compared with fee-for-service in the control group. We estimate 
the treatment effect using difference-in-differences and use propensity weights to address 
differences in exogenous variability between control and treatment patients. Our 
estimation results suggest that risk-based comprehensive payment model has notably 
dampened spending growth for the practices in the treatment group.  
Chapter two presents empirical evidence on the impact of patient reviews on 
consumers’ physician choices. Our study extracted data from ZocDoc.com—a unique 
 vii 
website that integrates patient reviews, and appointment scheduling for physicians on one 
platform. Our results suggest that patient reviews are becoming an important source of 
reputation for physicians. Because ZocDoc displays each physician’s rounded average 
rating to patients, we can use regression discontinuity to identify the causal impact of 
patient ratings on patient demand. Indeed, we find that half a star improvement in ratings, 
on a scale of 1 to 5 stars, leads to a 10% increase in the likelihood, at the mean, that a 
doctor will fill an appointment.  
The third chapter examines the joint effect of FDA's drug risk communication and 
consumer cost-sharing on the consumption of prescription drugs. Given different levels 
of cost sharing, one should expect the consumer response to any negative information 
regarding a particular drug to be slower at lower levels of cost-sharing. However, as a 
competing hypothesis one can also expect that the response to a severe drug risk 
communication to be swift and not responsive to cost sharing. Using MarketScan's 
database of privately insured individuals in the United, I find that higher cost sharing 
indeed has a significant impact of how patients respond to drug risk communication, I 
find that higher cost sharing combined with drug risk communication reduces the 
compliance rate.   
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1. Bending The Cost Curve? Results From A Comprehensive Primary Care 
Payment Pilot with Arlene S. Ash, and Randall P. Ellis  
1.1. Introduction 
We examine changes in costs during the first two years of a primary care practice 
transformation and payment reform initiative started in 2009 by the Capital District 
Physicians’ Health Plan (CDPHP), a not-for-profit network health plan in upstate New 
York. This patient-centered medical home (PCMH) pilot is of great interest as a “virtual 
all-payer” innovation (Feder (2011)), with practices encouraged to change treatment 
protocols for everyone, regardless of payer or benefit design. We examined whether the 
pilot saved money. 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) has funded several 
pilots and demonstrations to increase value in health care spending (CMMI (2011)). One 
strategy is to encourage primary care practices to become “patient-centered medical 
homes,” within which teams of clinical professionals use electronic medical records 
(EMRs) (McMullin et al. (2004), McMullin et al. (2005)) to sustain the health of a 
specified  panel of patients (PCPCC (2007)). Ideally, payments to practices support 
coordinated, preventive care that reduces avoidable utilization (Sia et al. (2004), Saultz 
and Lochner (2005), CMMS (2008)).   
The PCMH may save money while maintaining or improving quality (Grumbach 
et al. (2009), Grumbach and Grundy (2010), Reid et al. (2009), Reid et al. (2010), 
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Gilfillan (2010)), Nielsen (2012)). However, the best-studied pilots have involved  
integrated managed care plans, including Kaiser Permanente, the Veterans Health 
Administration, and Geisinger Health Plan with salaried primary care practitioners 
(PCPs) and other organizational features uncommon in the US (Nielsen (2012), PCPCC 
(2012)). Other pilots have primarily retained fee-for-service (FFS) payment with a small 
coordination–and-management supplement (Bitton (2010)); few have used models to 
substantially adjust payments or bonuses for differences in patient risk.    
In 2009 three EMR-enabled practices with at least 35 percent of their workloads 
covered by CDPHP volunteered for its PCMH pilot. Collectively, they employ fourteen 
physicians and four other professional staff (Feder (2011)). CDPHP implemented risk-
adjusted base payments and outcomes-based bonuses as advocated by Goroll et al. (2011) 
and developed in Ash and Ellis
 
(2012), and Ellis and Ash
 
(2012). In the new system, 63 
percent of payments were calculated as a risk-adjusted “bundle,” 27 percent as bonus, 
and only 10 percent by FFS (see Figure 1.B.1). Novel features of this pilot include: linked 
practice transformation and payment reform; diverse plan types and payers; and 
CDPHP’s not owning hospitals or specialist practices, yet unilaterally self-financing this 
transformation. While this pilot officially ended in 2010, CDPHP has since expanded this 
PCMH model to additional primary care practices (Feder (2011)). 
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1.2. Methods 
1.2.1. Data and Methodology 
We analyzed practices in Albany, Rensselaer, Saratoga, and Schenectady 
counties, where CDPHP’s three pilot (treatment) practices draw the most patients. We 
use eligibility, provider, medical and pharmacy claims data for the years 2007-2010, and 
the Massachusetts Health Quality Project (MHQP) assignment algorithm described in 
Song et al (2011) to assign 296,457 patients to 2,526 PCPs billing from 1,122 distinct 
practices. Broadly, patients are assigned during a year to the primary care practice that 
provided the plurality of their care in the last 18 months. Appendix A describes and 
compares MHQP’s patient assignment algorithm with CDPHP’s. 
1.2.2. Difference in Difference Specification 
To identify the effect of the PCMH on spending, we estimated 
                                           
                   (i) 
where i indicates a patient;  , his/her assigned practice; and t, year. The dependent 
variable, S, is annualized spending; D, the treatment dummy; t09 and t10 are time-period 
dummies for 2009 and 2010 (in contrast to 2008), respectively. The vector X contains 
individual characteristics including dummies for: Medicare and Medicaid versus the 
reference category of “privately insured”; HMO, preferred provider organization (PPO) 
and point of service (POS) versus FFS; and administrative services only (ASO) versus 
4 
 
non-ASO contracts. Fixed-effect    capture patient health status. Standard errors are 
clustered at the practice level. We modeled the effects of the PCMH using both fixed- 
and changing-PCP assignment; fixed-assignment estimates are robust to post-
implementation changes in patient mix.  
1.2.3. Propensity Score Analysis 
Table 1.1 describes treatment and control samples in 2008 and 2010. Privately 
insured and Medicaid populations are approximately 70% and 20%, respectively, of the 
control group versus 80% and 10% of those treated. Control group patients average 7 
years younger than treatment group patients (36 versus 43) in 2008 — largely because no 
treatment group practitioners were pediatricians.  
We used propensity score weights to address imbalances. That is, we first 
modeled the probability that a person is “treated,” (Basu et al. (2011)) then weighted each 
observation by that probability, using the proportional “overlap weight” (Li et al. (2007)) 
from a logistic model using age, gender, plan type, and payer type. We replicated the 
Song et al (2011)
 
algorithm, weighting separately within each study year to achieve 
comparable (propensity-weighted) mean values of all predictor variables in the control 
and treatment groups each year (Table 1.1, first and third columns). We also follow the 
Medicare program’s method of annualizing spending, and weighting each person-year 
observation by the fraction of the year he/she is eligible (Pope et al. (2004)). 
Plan members could receive care from any practice at any time, potentially 
changing their ex post practice assignment. Indeed, 2,889 members had their assigned 
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PCP changed between control and treatment practices during 2008-2010. Since switching 
could be endogenous to medical home implementation, our primary analysis assigned 
each person to their 2008 practices and omitted enrollees who enter and exit; an on-line 
supplement also reports results from other assignment and selection methods. As a 
sensitivity analysis we also present results using an alternative propensity scoring 
approach. 
1.3. Results 
We first examined changes over two years in the (raw) sample means of spending 
in treatment and control groups, adjusting only for fractional-year eligibility (the data are 
in the third from bottom row of Table 1.1). Average cost increased by $442 from 2008 to 
2010 for controls, versus $386 (that is, $56 less growth) for those treated. Table 1.1 
shows both the changing composition and spending of treatment and control groups. 
Analogous findings from 2008 to 2009 are similar: in the pilot’s first year, treatment 
group average costs grew by $48 less than in the control group. Since these estimates do 
not control for changes in insurance and who is assigned to the treatment practices, we 
next used regression analysis with patient-level fixed effects, multiple plan-type controls, 
and propensity score weighting.   
Table 1.2 summarizes findings from two fixed-effects, difference-in-difference 
models using weighted least squares; one used fixed- and the other changing-PCP 
assignment. Each person-year observation during 2008, 2009 or 2010 is weighted by the 
individual’s eligible months during that year multiplied by their propensity score, with 
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standard errors clustered by practice. These models differ in how they assign a patient 
year to the treatment or control group. Our preferred model (first two columns) uses 
Fixed 2008 PCP Assignment, as of 2008, prior to implementation, and excludes new 
entrants and exiters. Thus, it “holds treatment practices accountable” for all care received 
by their 2008 patients, even when later care is delivered by a non-PCMH practice; a 
PCMH does not “get credit” for lowering costs by shedding difficult patients or 
selectively recruiting healthy ones. With this specification, estimated savings were $198 
in the first 12 months (p=.20) and $289 in the second year (p=.15).  
The second model in Table 1.2 uses Changing PCP Assignment. Although, 
patients can enter, exit or be reassigned to a new practice yearly with this specification, 
point estimates for average treatment effect estimates remain similar in magnitude (-$186 
in year 1 and -$297 in year 2), and not statistically significant. A range of model variants, 
included in the supplementary material, produce similar findings: that is, similarly large, 
and non-statistically-significant point estimates for the treatment effect in each year.  
Although total estimated yearly cost savings are not statistically significant, some 
subsets of spending are. Sticking with our Fixed 2008 PCP Assignment method, Table 
1.3 presents Year 1 and Year 2 treatment effect estimates resulting from sixteen 
alternative specifications. Estimated savings change little when omitting controls, 
focusing on only primary care specialties, or non-pediatric primary care specialties. No 
statistically significant savings appear by payer type, although there is a hint of smaller 
savings on Medicaid enrollees relative to Medicare and privately-insured enrollees. 
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Estimated emergency department treatment effects are statistically significant (-11.0%, 
p=0.01) in Year 1 and remain meaningful (-9.6%, p=0.12) in Year 2. Looking at six 
outpatient service components, statistically significant reductions were found for 
evaluation and management visits (-3.4%, p=0.00 in Year 1; -6.5%, p=0.00 in Year 2) 
and laboratory tests (-16.5%, p=0.02 in Year 2).    
We also estimated models with CDPHP’s patient assignment algorithm, which 
uses the HMOs’ reported PCP assignment when available before applying an algorithm 
that favors primary care specialties over non-primary care specialties. Those results 
(Appendix B) also point towards savings, but less strongly than those shown here. 
Treatment and control practice samples differ in average risk scores, calculated by 
applying Verisk Health’s DxCG prospective risk adjustment model to prior-year data 
(Table 1.1). Mean risk scores start lower and grow less rapidly for treatment versus 
control patients, particularly after propensity score weighting. That is, the claims data 
suggest that treatment group patients start healthier and accumulate illnesses less rapidly 
than these controls.  
To estimate savings while holding “health status” (risk scores) constant, we added 
the diagnosis-based prospective risk score from the prior year to the propensity score 
predictors used elsewhere in this chapter. This propensity model provides weights for the 
controls that additionally adjust for observed differences in risk between treated and 
control patients. Detailed findings from replicating the regressions of Table 1.3 (but using 
the new weights) are in Table 1.C.1 of the Appendix C; this specification generally finds 
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larger effects and improved statistical significance. With this model, for example, 
estimated savings in Years 1 and 2 grow to $286 (8.8%, p=0.06) and $318 (9.8%, 
p=0.11); other estimates also become larger and p-values for savings drop towards, and 
below, the 0.05-level for Medicare beneficiaries, inpatient care, and imaging. One 
concern with these analyses is that apparent differences in health status between 
treatment and control practices could be endogenous (Wennberg et al. (2013)). For 
example, a PCMH might generate fewer nuisance visits (and illness coding) of the type 
that FFS billing encourages; conversely, a PCMH might proactively identify diseases that 
remain “hidden” in less intensively-managed patients. Due to concerns about the 
comparability of coding for treatment and control patients, we have highlighted the Table 
1.3 difference-in-differences estimates which address risk without measuring it – by 
using each person as their own control.  
1.4. Discussion 
We conducted many analyses, varying the sample, the duration of eligibility 
required for inclusion, practice assignment algorithms, fixed- versus variable-assignment 
rules, using and not using explicit measures of patient risk, and examining total spending 
versus several of its parts. While virtually all estimates of all outcomes showed savings, 
the amount varied considerably and almost never achieved significance at the 0.05 level. 
Our most credible model (with individual fixed effects and multiple control 
variables in the continuously enrolled sample) suggests reductions in health care 
spending growth on the order of 6% to 8% and large, statistically-significant percentage 
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reductions in emergency department (11.0%) and laboratory use (16.5%) after changing 
incentives for primary care providers in these newly created PCMHs.    
Such reductions in total health care spending, if real, would have covered 
CDPHP’s one-time $35,000 stipend to encourage transformation and annual performance 
bonuses of up to $50,000 per physician,
1
 although transformation costs were subsidized 
by CDPHP and its implementation partners, TransforMed and Verisk Health, making full 
costs hard to calculate.
1
 Cost analyses should be revisited in a greatly expanded set of 
“treatment” practices. 
This study has weaknesses. It describes only three self-selected practices during 
an initial two years of practice transformation and payment reform, with an evolving 
bonus system. Furthermore, even extensive modeling of limited data is no substitute for a 
larger sample; the very existence of savings remains a tentative finding. 
Still, the apparent PCMH effects are large, and patterns of suggested savings in 
inpatient services and selected outpatient services are plausible. As CDPHP expands its 
medical home pilot, its effect on clinical quality, patient satisfaction and costs will remain 
of keen interest. 
10 
 
1.5. Appendix A 
1.5.1. Massachusetts Health Quality Project's (MHQP) Primary Care 
Practitioner (PCP) Assignment Algorithm 
We evaluate the patient assignment algorithm used by the Massachusetts Health 
Quality Project (MHQP), which groups primary-care-related Current Procedural 
Terminology (CPT) codes into two categories: well visit/physical exams
 
and other 
Evaluation and Management (E&M) codes. The algorithm initially assigns a member 
only to a physician with a primary care specialty who has contracted with Capital District 
Physicians’ Health Plan (CDPHP) to serve as their primary care practitioner (PCP) only 
if the member had a well visit/physical exam in the last 18 months that was billed by this 
physician. If the member had a well visit/physical exam during this time frame with two 
or more such physicians, the member is assigned to the one with the most recent well 
visit/physical exam. Remaining members are assigned to the physician, with a non-
primary care specialty and a contractual agreement to serve as a PCP, if the member had 
a well visit/physical exam in the last 18 months that was billed by this physician. If the 
member has a well visit/physical exam during this time frame with two or more 
specialists, the algorithm attributes the member’s care to the specialist with the most 
recent well visit/physical exam. In our data there were some physicians whose specialty 
code could not be identified. In our modification of the MHQP algorithm we next repeat 
the above steps of the assignment methodology for these physicians. For the members 
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with no well visit/physical exam the algorithm repeats the above steps but replaces well 
visit/physical exam codes with the remaining E&M codes. 
After the initial steps, we allow members to be assigned to physicians who have 
not contracted with CDPHP to serve as a PCP using the same assignment strategy and 
codes as described previously. The members who remain unassigned are then attributed 
to the primary care physician with whom the member had a visit in the last 18 months, 
even though none of the visits to that physician were either well visits or E&M codes. 
The algorithm next attributes remaining unassigned members to a well-defined group of 
specialists with whom the member had a visit in the last 18 months, even though none of 
the visits to that physician were either well visits or E&M codes. Finally, members who 
remain unassigned are attributed to other physicians or facilities they have visited, even if 
they did not have a well visit or E&M code visit. Only patients making no medical visits 
during the 18-month period remain unassigned to any provider. 
Altogether, the MHQP algorithm assigned 296,457 patients in three years to 2,526 
PCPs billing from 1,122 distinct practices located in the four-county study region. Note 
that the substantially larger number of PCPs and practices from the MHQP algorithm 
arises because physicians who have not contracted with CDPHP to serve as a PCP are 
ultimately allowed to be assigned as the patient’s PCP, whereas the CDPHP assignment 
requires that a physician contract with the plan to be a PCP. 
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1.5.2. Capital District Physicians’ Health Plan's (CDPHP) Primary Care 
Practitioner (PCP) Assignment Algorithm 
To make base payments to participating PCMH practices and evaluate their 
performance, Capital District Physicians’ Health Plan (CPDHP) developed an algorithm 
to assign patients to specific primary care practitioner (PCP). The algorithm even assigns 
those patients who are enrolled in plans (such as preferred provider organizations (PPO)) 
which do not require patients to choose their PCP. Using 24 months of evaluation and 
management (E&M) codes, the CDPHP algorithm only assigns members to a physician 
who has signed a contract with CDPHP that allows him to serve as a PCP; the specialty 
of the physician is not restricted to primary care. If the member has at least one E&M 
code from any physician flagged as a PCP then the member is assigned to that 
practitioner. In the event that there are E&M codes from more than one practitioner the 
algorithm assigns the member to the practitioner from whom there are more codes in 
aggregate. Further, if the member has same number of E&M codes from more than one 
physician the member is assigned to the physician with whom he has more preventive 
codes. If there still exists a tie between two or more PCPs, patient assignment goes to the 
PCP visited most recently.  
In the absence of any E&M codes in the last 24 months the member is assigned to 
the physician who is the member's 'chosen' PCP in the CDPHP records. If no such PCP 
exists, the algorithm assigns the member to the PCP who bills more dollars. If none of the 
above holds for a member the algorithm assigns him to the PCP with the most recent 
13 
 
date-of-service given that the service is provided in an office setting and not in 
emergency department or urgent care setting. Altogether, the CDPHP algorithm assigned 
265,313 patients in three years to 752 PCPs billing from 324 distinct practices located in 
the four county study region. 
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for 2008 and 2010, with Changing PCP 
Assignment, and Including Entry and Exit 
 
  
Treatment
Control: 
unadjusted
Control: 
propensity 
weighted Treatment
Control: 
unadjusted
Control: 
propensity 
weighted
No of Patients: 11,686      217,276    217,276    10,734    217,957    217,957    
Payer Type
Medicare (%) 8 8 8 10 9 10
Medicaid (%) 8 18 8 10 23 10
Privately Insured (%) 84 74 83 80 68 79
Plan Type
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) (%) 76 79 76 71 77 72
Point Of Service (POS) (%) 10 8 10 2 2 2
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) (%) 4 4 4 7 6 7
Exclusive Provider Organization (EPO) (%) 10 10 10 20 15 20
Insurance Type
Administrative Services Only (ASO) (%) 17 14 17 11 10 11
Gender
Female (%) 55 55 55 56 55 56
Eligibility Months
Mean 11.4 11.2 11.4 11.4 11.2 11.4
Standard Deviation 2.0 2.2 0.5 1.94 2.2 0.4
Median 12 12 12 12 12 12
Age as of Dec. 31
Mean 42.7 36.0 42.5 43.9 36.8 43.6
Standard Deviation 18.64 22.3 4.7 19.21 22.7 4.6
Median 45 37 46 46 38 47
Lagged Prospective Risk Score
Mean 1.54         1.56         1.81         1.72        1.76         2.06         
Standard Deviation 7.74         9.51         0.71         9.30        10.51       0.76         
Median 0.93         0.78         0.97         1.01        0.86         1.09         
Total Medical Spending
Mean 3,022       2,895       3,356       3,408      3,337       3,883       
Standard Deviation 32,859      42,777      10,633      33,378    44,088      10,671      
Median 926          744          895          1,026      864          1,049       
2008 2010
Note: Eligibility months is the number of enrolled months in a plan offered by Capital District Physicians' Health Plan (CDPHP). 
Physician assignment is based on Massachusetts Health Quality Project (MHQP) Primary Care Practitioner (PCP) assignment 
algorithm.
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Table 1.2:  Difference-in-Difference Regressions Using Individual Fixed Effects 
 
 
Dependent Variable:
Parameter: Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Treatment X Year2009 -198 0.20 -186 0.31
Treatment X Year2010 -289 0.15 -297 0.24
Medicare 345 0.68 555 0.54
Medicaid -258 0.33 151 0.74
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) 114 0.38 18 0.95
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) -1141 0.00 -657 0.01
Point of Service (POS) -1556 0.00 -950 0.01
Administrative Services Only (ASO) 1993 0.01 926 0.01
Year2009 425 0.00 622 0.00
Year2010 865 0.00 1081 0.00
Treatment 730 0.02
No. of Patient Years
No. of Clusters (Practices)
R-Squared
Dependent Mean
Notes: Both models are weighted by months of eligibility and propensity scores. 
Standard errors are clustered for practice IDs. Omitted group is year=2008, private 
insurance, fee-for-service or exclusive provider organization, and non-ASO. Physician 
assignment is based on Massachusetts Health Quality Project (MHQP) Primary Care 
Practitioner (PCP) assignment algorithm. 
0.00250.0020
3,4133,428
692,270410,334
1,122941
Changing PCP 
Assignment, and 
Including Entry and 
Exit
Fixed 2008 PCP 
Assignment, and
Excluding Entry and 
Exit
Annualized Medical Spending
(2)(1)
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Table 1.3: Treatment Effect Sensitivity Analysis Using Alternative Samples and Dependent Variables, with Fixed 
2008 PCP Assignment, and Excluding Entry and Exit 
 
Model Name
No. of Patient 
Years
Dependent 
Mean
R-square Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2009
p-values Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2010
p-values
I. Models of Total Medical  Spending, All Payers
1. All Controls 410,334        3,428          0.0020 -198 156 -5.8% 0.20 -289 199 -8.4% 0.15
2. Basic Difference-in-Difference 410,334        3,428          0.0018 -198 153 -5.8% 0.20 -298 202 -8.7% 0.14
II. By Physician Specialty
3. Primary Care Specialties Only 380,320        3,495          0.0021 -184 156 -5.3% 0.24 -270 199 -7.7% 0.17
4. Non-Pediatric Primary Care Specialties 263,132        3,563          0.0023 -249 163 -7.0% 0.13 -353 212 -9.9% 0.10
III. By Payer
5. Medicare Only 47,660          6,301          0.0041 -378 400 -6.0% 0.34 -244 391 -3.9% 0.53
6. Medicaid Only 40,074          1,785          0.0009 -95 226 -5.3% 0.68 72 310 4.1% 0.82
7. Privately Insured Only 322,600        3,104          0.0019 -178 141 -5.7% 0.21 -311 197 -10.0% 0.12
IV. By Place of Service
8. Inpatient Care 410,334        912             0.0005 -66 65 -7.2% 0.31 -102 90 -11.1% 0.26
9. Emergency Care 410,334        92               0.0002 -10 4 -11.0% 0.01 -9 6 -9.6% 0.12
10. Outpatient Care, and Other Care 410,334        2,391          0.0039 -124 96 -5.2% 0.19 -167 112 -7.0% 0.14
V. By Type of Service†
11. Evaluation & Management 410,334        704             0.0106 -24 8 -3.4% 0.00 -46 9 -6.5% 0.00
12. Procedures 410,334        841             0.0008 -63 40 -7.5% 0.12 -77 49 -9.1% 0.12
13. Imaging 410,334        376             0.0004 -19 11 -5.2% 0.07 -15 12 -4.0% 0.20
14. Tests 410,334        175             0.0008 -14 10 -8.2% 0.15 -29 13 -16.5% 0.02
15. Durable Medical Equipment 410,334        113             0.0001 -5 9 -4.0% 0.60 1 31 1.0% 0.97
16. Others 410,334        238             0.0012 -24 18 -10.2% 0.18 -4 37 -1.7% 0.91
Notes: Each row is from a different regression. All models weighted by months of eligibility and propensity scores; standard errors are clustered for practice IDs. All models include individual fixed 
effects. In addition, models 5-7 include fixed effects for insurance type and plan type, while the remaining models include fixed effects for insurance type, plan type and payer type. †Clinical categories 
designated according to the Berenson-Eggers Type of Service (BETOS) classification, version 2012, applied to professional claims only. Physician assignment is based on Massachusetts Health Quality 
Project (MHQP) Primary Care Practitioner (PCP) assignment algorithm.
Year 1 Effects (2009) Year 2 Effects (2010)
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Table 1.A.1: Ex Post Assignment of Patients to Physicians 
 
  
Massachusetts Health Quality Project MHQP 
Primary Care Practioner (PCP) Assignment 
Algorithm
Capital District Physicians’ Health Plan (CDPHP) PCP Assignment 
Algorithm
Claims Used: 18 months 24 months 
Codes Used Intially: Well care visits Evaluation and Management (E&M) codes including well care visits
Codes Used Susequently: Other E&M
Other visits
Assigned to: Physicians with primary care specialty Physicians with CDPHP PCP contract 
Physician Speciality: *Other physicians with CDPHP PCP contract Not restricted to primary care specialty 
Also: All other physicians Specialists only if CDPHP PCP contract 
Tiebreaker #1 Most recent well care visit Physician with more E&M codes
Tiebreaker #2 Most recent E&M visit More preventive codes
Tiebreaker #3 Most office visits for any reason Most recent PCP visited
Tiebreaker #4 Most recent office visit for any reason Member's 'chosen' PCP
Tiebreaker #5 Most spending on non E&M
Tiebreaker #6 Most recent any other office visit
Result:  2526 PCPs billing from 1122 practices 752 PCPs billing from 324 practices
Notes: *as modified for this paper
Any other visit to an eligible provider 
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Figure 1.B.1: CDPHP Service Area and four core counties used for the analysis. 
 
Note: The above figure highlights the service area and the four counties to which the treatment and control 
group in the medical home experiment belonged. These four counties from which the treatment and control 
group samples are drawn are Albany, Rensselaer, Saratoga, and Schenectady. 
  
Four core counties used 
for this study 
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Figure 1.B.2: Comparison of the Payment Models 
 
 
Note: The pie chart on the extreme left describes the physician reimbursement system in place at Capital 
District Physician's Health Plan (CDPHP) before the payment reform. The pie chart at the center gives a 
picture of how a conventional pay-for-performance (P4P) payment system looks like. Finally the pie chart 
at the extreme right describes the risk-adjusted physician reimbursement strategy implemented at CDPHP 
to support the Patient-Centered Medical Home.    
  
CDPHP before any change
90-94% FFS
6% Quality Payment
$1pmpm Care mgmt Fee
Conventional P4P allocation 
80-90% FFS
10% Quality Payment
$5pmpm Care mgmt Fee
CDPHP MH payment system 
10% FFS 
27% Bonus Payment
63% Risk-Adjusted Payment
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Figure 1.B.3. Age Distribution in 2008 Using Massachusetts Health Quality Project 
(MHQP) Primary Care Practitioner (PCP) Assignment, with Changing PCP 
Assignment, and Including Entry and Exit 
 Note: The age distribution for the two groups—control and treatment—are displayed in the above 
figure. The Massachusetts Health Quality Project (MHQP) Primary Care Practitioner (PCP) Assignment 
algorithm assigns patients to practices which allows us to group these patients into control and treatment 
groups. For the purpose of this figure we do not restrict the patients to the physicians/practices they were 
assigned to in the first year of the pilot, hence the PCP assignment can change in the next year. Patients 
who join in the later years or exit the pilot are also included in the sample used for this figure. The 
difference in the distributions between control and treatment groups encouraged us to use the propensity 
weighting strategy to get a control group comparable to the treatment group..     
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Table 1.B.1: Summary Statistics for Massachusetts Health Quality Project (MHQP) Primary Care Practitioner (PCP) 
Assignment, with Changing PCP Assignment, and Including Entry and Exit 
 
Treatment
Control: 
unadjusted
Control: 
propensity 
weighted Treatment
Control: 
unadjusted
Control: 
propensity 
weighted Treatment
Control: 
unadjusted
Control: 
propensity 
weighted
Observations: 11,686    217,276    217,276    11,770    222,847    222,847    10,734    217,957    217,957    
Payer Type
Medicare (%) 8 8 8 9 8 9 10 9 10
Medicaid (%) 8 18 8 9 20 9 10 23 10
Privately Insured (%) 84 74 83 83 72 82 80 68 79
Plan Type
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) (%) 76 79 76 74 77 74 71 77 72
Point Of Service (POS) (%) 10 8 10 2 2 2 2 2 2
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) (%) 4 4 4 11 9 11 7 6 7
Exclusive Provider Organization (EPO) (%) 10 10 10 13 12 13 20 15 20
Insurance Type
Administrative Services Only (ASO) (%) 17 14 17 17 14 16 11 10 11
Gender
Female (%) 55 55 55 56 55 56 56 55 56
Eligibility Months
Mean 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Standard Deviation 43 36 42 43 36 43 44 37 44
Median 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 2 0
Age as of Dec. 31
Mean 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Standard Deviation 19 22 5 19 22 5 19 23 5
Median 45 37 46 45 37 46 46 38 47
Lagged Prospective Risk Score
Mean 1.54 1.56 1.81 1.62 1.63 1.90 1.72 1.76 2.06
Standard Deviation 7.74 9.51 0.71 9.01 10.04 0.74 9.30 10.51 0.76
Median 0.93 0.78 0.97 0.96 0.80 1.00 1.01 0.86 1.09
Total Medical Spending
Mean 3022 2895 3356 3239 3160 3648 3408 3337 3883
Standard Deviation 32859 42777 10633 44238 40309 9874 33378 44088 10671
Median 926 744 895 978 837 997 1026 864 1049
2008 2009 2010
Note: Eligibility months is the number of enrolled months in a plan offered by Capital District Physicians' Health Plan (CDPHP). Physician assignment is based on 
Massachusetts Health Quality Project (MHQP) Primary Care Practitioner (PCP) assignment algorithm.
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Table 1.B.2: Summary Statistics for Massachusetts Health Quality Project (MHQP) Primary Care Practitioner (PCP) 
Assignment, with Fixed PCP Assignment, and Including Entry and Exit 
 
Treatment
Control: 
unadjusted
Control: 
propensity 
weighted Treatment
Control: 
unadjusted
Control: 
propensity 
weighted Treatment
Control: 
unadjusted
Control: 
propensity 
weighted
Observations: 11,686    217,276    217,276    11,671    222,946    222,946    10,903    217,788    217,788    
Payer Type
Medicare (%) 8 8 8 9 8 9 11 9 11
Medicaid (%) 8 18 8 9 20 9 10 23 11
Privately Insured (%) 84 74 83 82 72 82 79 68 79
Plan Type
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) (%) 76 79 76 74 77 74 72 77 72
Point Of Service (POS) (%) 10 8 10 2 2 2 2 2 2
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) (%) 4 4 4 11 9 11 6 6 6
Exclusive Provider Organization (EPO) (%) 10 10 10 13 12 13 20 15 20
Insurance Type
Administrative Services Only (ASO) (%) 17 14 17 17 14 16 11 10 11
Gender
Female (%) 55 55 55 56 55 56 56 55 56
Eligibility Months
Mean 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Standard Deviation 43 36 42 43 36 43 44 37 44
Median 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 2 0
Age as of Dec. 31
Mean 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Standard Deviation 19 22 5 19 22 5 19 23 5
Median 45 37 46 45 37 47 46 38 48
Lagged Prospective Risk Score
Mean 1.54 1.56 1.81 1.63 1.63 1.91 1.76 1.76 2.09
Standard Deviation 7.74 9.51 0.71 8.80 10.05 0.74 9.46 10.51 0.77
Median 0.93 0.78 0.97 0.97 0.80 1.01 1.03 0.86 1.11
Total Medical Spending
Mean 3022 2895 3356 3211 3161 3670 3421 3337 3932
Standard Deviation 32859 42777 10633 37090 40686 9925 35142 44027 10811
Median 926 744 895 978 837 1003 1026 864 1066
2008 2009 2010
Note: Eligibility months is the number of enrolled months in a plan offered by Capital District Physicians' Health Plan (CDPHP). Physician assignment is based on 
Massachusetts Health Quality Project (MHQP) Primary Care Practitioner (PCP) assignment algorithm.
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Table 1.B.3: Summary Statistics for Massachusetts Health Quality Project (MHQP) Primary Care Practitioner (PCP) 
Assignment, with Fixed 2008 PCP Assignment, and Excluding Entry and Exit
 
Treatment
Control: 
unadjusted
Control: 
propensity 
weighted Treatment
Control: 
unadjusted
Control: 
propensity 
weighted Treatment
Control: 
unadjusted
Control: 
propensity 
weighted
Observations: 7,405      129,373    129,373    7,405      129,373    129,373    7,405      129,373    129,373    
Payer Type
Medicare (%) 11 11 11 12 12 12 13 12 13
Medicaid (%) 4 10 4 4 10 4 4 10 4
Privately Insured (%) 85 79 85 84 78 84 83 78 83
Plan Type
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) (%) 83 83 83 78 79 78 71 75 71
Point Of Service (POS) (%) 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) (%) 4 4 4 6 6 6 7 6 7
Exclusive Provider Organization (EPO) (%) 9 8 9 13 13 13 21 16 20
Insurance Type
Administrative Services Only (ASO) (%) 13 13 13 13 13 13 12 13 12
Gender
Female (%) 57 56 57 57 56 57 57 56 57
Eligibility Months
Mean 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Standard Deviation 46 39 46 47 40 47 48 41 48
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Age as of Dec. 31
Mean 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Standard Deviation 18 23 5 18 23 5 18 23 5
Median 48 43 50 49 44 51 50 45 51
Lagged Prospective Risk Score
Mean 1.64 1.66 1.89 1.78 1.82 2.08 1.91 1.99 2.27
Standard Deviation 7.40 9.07 0.64 8.67 10.28 0.72 9.95 11.25 0.80
Median 1.05 0.90 1.12 1.11 0.98 1.22 1.17 1.06 1.31
Total Medical Spending
Mean 2991 2821 3183 3228 3180 3610 3560 3524 4040
Standard Deviation 28867 36886 8785 32250 36025 8989 32972 41609 10397
Median 1072 864 1028 1088 955 1139 1134 992 1199
2008 2009 2010
Note: Eligibility months is the number of enrolled months in a plan offered by Capital District Physicians' Health Plan (CDPHP). Physician assignment is based on 
Massachusetts Health Quality Project (MHQP) Primary Care Practitioner (PCP) assignment algorithm.
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Table 1.B.4: Basic Difference-in-Difference Regressions Using Massachusetts Health Quality Project (MHQP) 
Primary Care Practitioner (PCP) Assignment 
 
 
Dependent Variable:
Parameter: Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Treatment X Year2009 -194 0.20 -130 0.33 -78 0.56
Treatment X Year2010 -294 0.06 -184 0.18 -144 0.28
No of Patient Years
R-Squared
Dependent Mean 3,428 3,422 3,413
410,334 692,270 692,270
Fixed 2008 PCP 
Assignment, and
Excluding Entry 
and Exit
Fixed PCP 
Assignment, and 
Allowing Entry and 
Exit
Changing Patient 
Assignment, and 
Including Entry and 
Exit
Annualized Medical Spending
(1) (2) (3)
Notes: Each model is estimated without individual fixed effects. The control variables used 
are dummies for 2009, 2010, treatment, and their interaction. Omitted group is year=2008. 
All models are weighted by months of eligibility and propensity scores; standard errors are 
not clustered. Physician assignment is based on Massachusetts Health Quality Project 
(MHQP) Primary Care Practitioner (PCP) assignment algorithm.
0.0011 0.0006 0.0005
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Table 1.B.5: Difference-in-Difference Regression Using Individual Fixed Effects 
and Massachusetts Health Quality Project (MHQP) Primary Care 
Practitioner (PCP) Assignment 
  
 
Dependent Variable:
Parameter: Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Treatment X Year2009 -198 0.20 -220 0.22 -186 0.31
Treatment X Year2010 -289 0.15 -332 0.13 -297 0.24
Medicare 345 0.68 369 0.68 555 0.54
Medicaid -258 0.33 129 0.74 151 0.74
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) 114 0.38 24 0.94 18 0.95
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) -1141 0.00 -954 0.00 -657 0.01
Point of Service (POS) -1556 0.00 -1246 0.00 -950 0.01
Administrative Services Only (ASO) 1993 0.01 1436 0.00 926 0.01
Year2009 425 0.00 624 0.00 622 0.00
Year2010 865 0.00 1092 0.00 1081 0.00
Treatment 730 0.02
No. of Patient Years
No. of Clusters (Practices)
R-Squared
Dependent Mean 3,428 3,413
Notes: All models are weighted by months of eligibility and propensity scores. Standard errors are clustered for 
practice IDs. Omitted group is year=2008, private insurance, fee-for-service or exclusive provider organization, 
and non-ASO. Physician assignment is based on Massachusetts Health Quality Project (MHQP) Primary Care 
Practitioner (PCP) assignment algorithm. 
(2)
410,334 692,270
941 1,122
0.0020 0.0025
Fixed 2008 PCP 
Assignment, and
Excluding Entry and 
Exit
Changing PCP 
Assignment, and 
Including Entry and 
Exit
Annualized Medical Spending
(1) (3)
Fixed 2008 PCP 
Assignment, and
Including Entry and 
Exit
0.0024
3,422
692,270
1,122
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Table 1.B.6: Treatment Effect Sensitivity Analysis Using Massachusetts Health Quality Project (MHQP) Primary 
Care Practitioner (PCP) Assignment, with Fixed 2008 PCP Assignment, and Excluding Entry and Exit 
 
Model Name
No. of Patient 
Years
Dependent 
Mean
R-square Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2009
p-values Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2010
p-values
I. Models of Total Medical  Spending, All Payers
1. All Controls 410,334        3,428          0.0020 -198 156 -5.8% 0.20 -289 199 -8.4% 0.15
2. Basic Difference-in-Difference 410,334        3,428          0.0018 -198 153 -5.8% 0.20 -298 202 -8.7% 0.14
II. By Physician Specialty
3. Primary Care Specialties Only 380,320        3,495          0.0021 -184 156 -5.3% 0.24 -270 199 -7.7% 0.17
4. Non-Pediatric Primary Care Specialties 263,132        3,563          0.0023 -249 163 -7.0% 0.13 -353 212 -9.9% 0.10
III. By Payer
5. Medicare Only 47,660          6,301          0.0041 -378 400 -6.0% 0.34 -244 391 -3.9% 0.53
6. Medicaid Only 40,074          1,785          0.0009 -95 226 -5.3% 0.68 72 310 4.1% 0.82
7. Privately Insured Only 322,600        3,104          0.0019 -178 141 -5.7% 0.21 -311 197 -10.0% 0.12
IV. By Place of Service
8. Inpatient Care 410,334        912             0.0005 -66 65 -7.2% 0.31 -102 90 -11.1% 0.26
9. Emergency Care 410,334        2,391          0.0039 -124 96 -5.2% 0.19 -167 112 -7.0% 0.14
10. Outpatient Care, and Other Care 410,334        92               0.0002 -10 4 -11.0% 0.01 -9 6 -9.6% 0.12
V. By Type of Service†
11. Evaluation & Management 410,334        704             0.0106 -24 8 -3.4% 0.00 -46 9 -6.5% 0.00
12. Procedures 410,334        841             0.0008 -63 40 -7.5% 0.12 -77 49 -9.1% 0.12
13. Imaging 410,334        376             0.0004 -19 11 -5.2% 0.07 -15 12 -4.0% 0.20
14. Tests 410,334        175             0.0008 -14 10 -8.2% 0.15 -29 13 -16.5% 0.02
15. Durable Medical Equipment 410,334        113             0.0001 -5 9 -4.0% 0.60 1 31 1.0% 0.97
16. Others 410,334        238             0.0012 -24 18 -10.2% 0.18 -4 37 -1.7% 0.91
Year 1 Effects (2009) Year 2 Effects (2010)
Notes: Each row is from a different regression. All models weighted by months of eligibility and propensity scores; standard errors are clustered for practice IDs. All models include individual fixed 
effects. In addition, models 5-7 include fixed effects for insurance type and plan type, while the remaining models include fixed effects for insurance type, plan type and payer type. †Clinical categories 
designated according to the Berenson-Eggers Type of Service (BETOS) classification, version 2012, applied to professional claims only.
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Table 1.B.7: Treatment Effect Sensitivity Analysis Using Massachusetts Health Quality Project (MHQP) Primary 
Care Practitioner (PCP) Assignment, with Fixed PCP Assignment, and Including Entry and Exit 
 
Model Name
No. of Patient 
Years
Dependent 
Mean
R-square Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2009
p-values Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2010
p-values
I. Models of Total Medical  Spending, All Payers
1. All Controls 692,270        3,422          0.0024 -220 180 -6.4% 0.22 -332 219 -9.7% 0.13
2. Basic Difference-in-Difference 692,270        3,422          0.0023 -218 174 -6.4% 0.21 -337 220 -9.8% 0.13
II. By Physician Specialty
3. Primary Care Specialties Only 623,836        3,500          0.0026 -218 184 -6.2% 0.23 -320 226 -9.1% 0.16
4. Non-Pediatric Primary Care Specialties 424,451        3,574          0.0029 -297 196 -8.3% 0.13 -429 244 -12.0% 0.08
III. By Payer
5. Medicare Only 58,961          7,510          0.0087 -852 438 -11.4% 0.05 -856 559 -11.4% 0.13
6. Medicaid Only 136,588        2,106          0.0009 -8 355 -0.4% 0.98 -31 308 -1.5% 0.92
7. Privately Insured Only 496,721        3,084          0.0020 -165 158 -5.4% 0.29 -289 209 -9.4% 0.17
IV. By Place of Service
8. Inpatient Care 692,270        1,014          0.0008 -141 95 -13.9% 0.14 -166 118 -16.4% 0.16
9. Emergency Care 692,270        2,264          0.0037 -62 106 -2.7% 0.56 -134 109 -5.9% 0.22
10. Outpatient Care, and Other Care 692,270        103             0.0002 -14 4 -13.4% 0.00 -8 6 -7.7% 0.19
V. By Type of Service†
11. Evaluation & Management 692,270        669             0.0096 -32 8 -4.7% 0.00 -51 8 -7.6% 0.00
12. Procedures 692,270        792             0.0008 -36 46 -4.5% 0.44 -66 52 -8.3% 0.20
13. Imaging 692,270        352             0.0005 -22 9 -6.1% 0.02 -16 14 -4.4% 0.27
14. Tests 692,270        164             0.0008 -11 13 -6.6% 0.39 -20 14 -12.1% 0.16
15. Durable Medical Equipment 692,270        104             0.0002 -3 9 -2.7% 0.76 5 24 5.0% 0.82
16. Others 692,270        245             0.0010 6 28 2.5% 0.83 -2 41 -0.8% 0.96
VI. By Categories of Eligibility
17. Eligible for at least one month each year 503,265        3,461          0.0025 -134 133 -3.9% 0.32 -308 199 -8.9% 0.12
18. Full 36 months eligibility (2008-2010) 410,334        3,412          0.0020 -189 157 -5.5% 0.23 -277 199 -8.1% 0.16
19. Less than 36 months eligibility (2008-2010) 281,936        3,442          0.0051 -334 374 -9.7% 0.37 -572 486 -16.6% 0.24
20. New Arrivers and Early Departers 189,005        3,287          0.0042 -632 529 -19.2% 0.23 -578 450 -17.6% 0.20
Year 1 Effects (2009) Year 2 Effects (2010)
Notes: Each row is from a different regression. All models are weighted by months of eligibility and propensity scores. Standard errors are clustered for practice IDs. All models include individual 
fixed effects. In addition, models 5-7 include fixed effects for insurance type and plan type, while the remaining models include fixed effects for insurance type, plan type and payer type.  †Clinical 
categories designated according to the Berenson-Eggers Type of Service (BETOS) classification, version 2012, applied to professional claims only.
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Table 1.B.8: Treatment Effect Sensitivity Analysis Using Massachusetts Health Quality Project (MHQP) Primary 
Care Practitioner (PCP) Assignment, with Changing PCP Assignment, and Including Entry and Exit 
  
Model Name
No. of Patient 
Years
Dependent 
Mean
R-square Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2009
p-values Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2010
p-values
I. Models of Total Medical  Spending, All Payers
1. All Controls 692,270        3,413          0.0025 -186 183 -5.4% 0.31 -297 254 -8.7% 0.24
2. Basic Difference-in-Difference 692,270        3,413          0.0024 -184 176 -5.4% 0.30 -299 255 -8.8% 0.24
II. By Physician Specialty
3. Primary Care Specialties Only 623,836        3,469          0.0025 -206 186 -5.9% 0.27 -327 259 -9.4% 0.21
4. Non-Pediatric Primary Care Specialties 424,451        3,562          0.0030 -284 198 -8.0% 0.15 -408 278 -11.4% 0.14
III. By Payer
5. Medicare Only 58,961          7,510          0.0084 -958 575 -12.8% 0.10 -716 593 -9.5% 0.23
6. Medicaid Only 136,588        2,118          0.0010 149 334 7.0% 0.66 54 274 2.6% 0.84
7. Privately Insured Only 496,721        3,076          0.0020 -130 154 -4.2% 0.40 -283 239 -9.2% 0.24
IV. By Place of Service
8. Inpatient Care 692,270        1,009          0.0008 -135 83 -13.4% 0.10 -178 137 -17.7% 0.19
9. Emergency Care 692,270        2,262          0.0037 -36 115 -1.6% 0.76 -91 123 -4.0% 0.46
10. Outpatient Care, and Other Care 692,270        103             0.0001 -10 4 -10.0% 0.01 -7 6 -6.6% 0.30
V. By Type of Service†
11. Evaluation & Management 692,270        668             0.0096 -25 7 -3.7% 0.00 -47 7 -7.0% 0.00
12. Procedures 692,270        793             0.0009 -15 47 -1.9% 0.75 -42 61 -5.3% 0.49
13. Imaging 692,270        349             0.0005 -16 10 -4.5% 0.13 -12 16 -3.3% 0.48
14. Tests 692,270        164             0.0008 -8 13 -5.0% 0.53 -23 15 -14.2% 0.12
15. Durable Medical Equipment 692,270        103             0.0002 -2 9 -1.7% 0.85 2 25 1.5% 0.95
16. Others 692,270        246             0.0010 13 31 5.3% 0.67 8 47 3.2% 0.87
VI. By Categories of Eligibility
17. Eligible for at least one month each year 503,265        3,436          0.0025 -107 132 -3.1% 0.42 -267 236 -7.8% 0.26
18. Full 36 months eligibility (2008-2010) 410,334        3,391          0.0020 -171 160 -5.0% 0.28 -233 226 -6.9% 0.30
19. Less than 36 months eligibility (2008-2010) 281,936        3,458          0.0053 -213 348 -6.1% 0.54 -490 472 -14.2% 0.30
20. New Arrivers and Early Departers 189,005        3,334          0.0048 -554 540 -16.6% 0.30 -600 477 -18.0% 0.21
Year 1 Effects (2009) Year 2 Effects (2010)
Notes: Each row is from a different regression. All models are weighted by months of eligibility and propensity scores. Standard errors are clustered for practice IDs. All models include individual 
fixed effects. In addition, models 5-7 include fixed effects for insurance type and plan type, while the remaining models include fixed effects for insurance type, plan type and payer type.  †Clinical 
categories designated according to the Berenson-Eggers Type of Service (BETOS) classification, version 2012, applied to professional claims only.
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Table 1.B.9: Treatment Effect Sensitivity Analysis Using Capital District Physicians’ Health Plan (CDPHP) Primary 
Care Practitioner (PCP) Assignment, with Fixed 2008 PCP Assignment, and Excluding Entry and Exit 
 
  
Model Name
No. of Patient 
Years
Dependent 
Mean
R-square Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2009
p-values Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2010
p-values
I. Models of Total Medical  Spending, All Payers
1. All Controls 304,260       3,628          0.0026 -84 177 -2.3% 0.63 -165 237 -4.5% 0.49
2. Basic Difference-in-Difference 304,260       3,628          0.0023 -84 174 -2.3% 0.63 -172 237 -4.7% 0.47
II. By Physician Specialty
3. Primary Care Specialties Only 294,562       3,568          0.0023 -102 178 -2.9% 0.57 -161 238 -4.5% 0.50
4. Non-Pediatric Primary Care Specialties 200,072       3,639          0.0026 -174 187 -4.8% 0.35 -224 251 -6.2% 0.37
III. By Payer
5. Medicare Only 40,545         6,489          0.0047 -140 443 -2.2% 0.75 -146 339 -2.3% 0.67
6. Medicaid Only 29,011         1,990          0.0025 -234 175 -11.7% 0.18 48 348 2.4% 0.89
7. Privately Insured Only 234,704       3,237          0.0024 -66 181 -2.0% 0.72 -169 261 -5.2% 0.52
IV. By Place of Service
8. Inpatient Care 304,260       924             0.0006 -22 75 -2.4% 0.77 -99 96 -10.7% 0.30
9. Emergency Care 304,260       2,576          0.0048 -60 114 -2.3% 0.60 -71 141 -2.8% 0.61
10. Outpatient Care, and Other Care 304,260       96               0.0004 -9 5 -9.6% 0.06 -2 6 -1.7% 0.79
V. By Type of Service†
11. Evaluation & Management 304,260       767             0.0127 -10 13 -1.3% 0.42 -32 8 -4.1% 0.00
12. Procedures 304,260       891             0.0013 -12 48 -1.3% 0.80 -14 58 -1.6% 0.80
13. Imaging 304,260       405             0.0005 -11 15 -2.7% 0.46 2 19 0.4% 0.93
14. Tests 304,260       192             0.0007 -7 13 -3.8% 0.56 -20 16 -10.6% 0.21
15. Durable Medical Equipment 304,260       122             0.0001 -8 17 -6.8% 0.63 -5 34 -4.0% 0.88
16. Others 304,260       245             0.0016 -14 20 -5.9% 0.48 18 42 7.4% 0.67
Notes: Each row is from a different regression. All models are weighted by months of eligibility and propensity scores. Standard errors are clustered for practice IDs. All models include individual fixed 
effects. In addition, models 5-7 include fixed effects for insurance type and plan type, while the remaining models include fixed effects for insurance type, plan type and payer type.  †Clinical categories 
designated according to the Berenson-Eggers Type of Service (BETOS) classification, version 2012, applied to professional claims only.
Year 1 Effects (2009) Year 2 Effects (2010)
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Table 1.B.10: Treatment Effect Sensitivity Analysis Using Capital District Physicians’ Health Plan (CDPHP) Primary 
Care Practitioner (PCP) Assignment, with Fixed PCP Assignment, and Including Entry and Exit 
 
Model Name
No. of Patient 
Years
Dependent 
Mean
R-square Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2009
p-values Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2010
p-values
I. Models of Total Medical  Spending, All Payers
1. All Controls 573,476       3,495          0.0028 -138 191 -4.0% 0.47 -231 273 -6.6% 0.40
2. Basic Difference-in-Difference 573,476       3,495          0.0026 -138 179 -4.0% 0.44 -234 266 -6.7% 0.38
II. By Physician Specialty
3. Primary Care Specialties Only 549,373       3,415          0.0026 -136 193 -4.0% 0.48 -212 272 -6.2% 0.44
4. Non-Pediatric Primary Care Specialties 372,093       3,480          0.0029 -218 205 -6.3% 0.29 -311 291 -8.9% 0.29
III. By Payer
5. Medicare Only 54,306         7,517          0.0086 -1107 431 -14.7% 0.01 -1063 551 -14.1% 0.05
6. Medicaid Only 107,408       2,222          0.0012 -147 239 -6.6% 0.54 -238 376 -10.7% 0.53
7. Privately Insured Only 411,762       3,129          0.0024 -15 199 -0.5% 0.94 -111 317 -3.6% 0.72
IV. By Place of Service
8. Inpatient Care 573,476       989             0.0009 -111 89 -11.3% 0.21 -137 137 -13.8% 0.32
9. Emergency Care 573,476       2,367          0.0043 -14 113 -0.6% 0.90 -73 143 -3.1% 0.61
10. Outpatient Care, and Other Care 573,476       104             0.0002 -11 5 -10.4% 0.03 -2 6 -1.9% 0.76
V. By Type of Service†
11. Evaluation & Management 573,476       707             0.0109 -16 10 -2.3% 0.11 -37 8 -5.2% 0.00
12. Procedures 573,476       815             0.0011 4 55 0.5% 0.94 -33 64 -4.1% 0.61
13. Imaging 573,476       369             0.0005 -13 12 -3.6% 0.28 -7 19 -1.9% 0.71
14. Tests 573,476       174             0.0009 -4 15 -2.5% 0.77 -17 18 -9.8% 0.35
15. Durable Medical Equipment 573,476       107             0.0002 -7 11 -6.7% 0.51 -4 27 -3.3% 0.90
16. Others 573,476       245             0.0013 9 23 3.8% 0.68 27 39 11.1% 0.48
VI. By Categories of Eligibility
17. Eligible for at least one month each year 359,064       3,661          0.0030 -33 168 -0.9% 0.85 -207 244 -5.7% 0.40
18. Full 36 months eligibility (2008-2010) 304,260       3,593          0.0025 -71 177 -2.0% 0.69 -144 237 -4.0% 0.54
19. Less than 36 months eligibility (2008-2010) 269,216       3,355          0.0042 -318 233 -9.5% 0.17 -504 427 -15.0% 0.24
20. New Arrivers and Early Departers 214,412       3,180          0.0033 -487 514 -15.3% 0.34 -355 647 -11.2% 0.58
Year 1 Effects (2009) Year 2 Effects (2010)
Notes: Each row is from a different regression. All models are weighted by months of eligibility and propensity scores. Standard errors are clustered for practice IDs. All models include individual fixed 
effects. In addition, models 5-7 include fixed effects for insurance type and plan type, while the remaining models include fixed effects for insurance type, plan type and payer type.  †Clinical categories 
designated according to the Berenson-Eggers Type of Service (BETOS) classification, version 2012, applied to professional claims only.
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Table 1.B.11: Treatment Effect Sensitivity Analysis Using Capital District Physicians’ Health Plan (CDPHP) Primary 
Care Practitioner (PCP) Assignment, with Changing PCP Assignment, and Including Entry and Exit 
 
Model Name
No. of Patient 
Years
Dependent 
Mean
R-square Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2009
p-values Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2010
p-values
I. Models of Total Medical  Spending, All Payers
1. All Controls 573,476       3,436          0.0025 -285 171 -8.3% 0.10 -367 282 -10.7% 0.19
2. Basic Difference-in-Difference 573,476       3,436          0.0024 -285 161 -8.3% 0.08 -365 277 -10.6% 0.19
II. By Physician Specialty
3. Primary Care Specialties Only 549,373       3,375          0.0024 -261 171 -7.7% 0.13 -294 278 -8.7% 0.29
4. Non-Pediatric Primary Care Specialties 372,093       3,465          0.0027 -324 181 -9.3% 0.07 -393 296 -11.3% 0.18
III. By Payer
5. Medicare Only 54,306         7,362          0.0075 -1537 440 -20.9% 0.00 -1300 664 -17.7% 0.05
6. Medicaid Only 107,408       2,196          0.0010 -168 271 -7.7% 0.53 -582 320 -26.5% 0.07
7. Privately Insured Only 411,762       3,089          0.0021 -142 164 -4.6% 0.39 -225 334 -7.3% 0.50
IV. By Place of Service
8. Inpatient Care 573,476       961             0.0008 -188 69 -19.5% 0.01 -228 132 -23.7% 0.08
9. Emergency Care 573,476       2,341          0.0040 -78 108 -3.3% 0.47 -115 157 -4.9% 0.46
10. Outpatient Care, and Other Care 573,476       103             0.0002 -10 5 -9.6% 0.05 -3 6 -3.2% 0.59
V. By Type of Service†
11. Evaluation & Management 573,476       700             0.0107 -23 9 -3.3% 0.01 -46 8 -6.5% 0.00
12. Procedures 573,476       807             0.0011 -15 55 -1.8% 0.79 -37 74 -4.6% 0.61
13. Imaging 573,476       363             0.0004 -19 10 -5.1% 0.07 -11 21 -3.1% 0.60
14. Tests 573,476       172             0.0008 -9 13 -5.2% 0.48 -21 19 -12.0% 0.28
15. Durable Medical Equipment 573,476       104             0.0002 -17 9 -16.0% 0.08 -12 28 -11.8% 0.66
16. Others 573,476       242             0.0011 -11 19 -4.7% 0.56 10 40 4.0% 0.81
VI. By Categories of Eligibility
17. Eligible for at least one month each year 359,064       3,579          0.0026 -201 131 -5.6% 0.12 -366 250 -10.2% 0.14
18. Full 36 months eligibility (2008-2010) 304,260       3,536          0.0022 -215 149 -6.1% 0.15 -252 243 -7.1% 0.30
19. Less than 36 months eligibility (2008-2010) 269,216       3,294          0.0040 -470 247 -14.3% 0.06 -707 401 -21.5% 0.08
20. New Arrivers and Early Departers 214,412       3,165          0.0032 -542 535 -17.1% 0.31 -375 718 -11.8% 0.60
Year 1 Effects (2009) Year 2 Effects (2010)
Notes: Each row is from a different regression. All models are weighted by months of eligibility and propensity scores. Standard errors are clustered for practice IDs. All models include individual fixed 
effects. In addition, models 5-7 include fixed effects for insurance type and plan type, while the remaining models include fixed effects for insurance type, plan type and payer type.  †Clinical categories 
designated according to the Berenson-Eggers Type of Service (BETOS) classification, version 2012, applied to professional claims only.
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Table 1.C.1: Treatment Effect Sensitivity Analysis Using Massachusetts Health Quality Project (MHQP) Primary Care 
Practitioner (PCP) Assignment and Propensity Weighting Using Lagged Prospective Risk Score, with Fixed 2008 PCP 
Assignment, and Excluding Entry and Exit 
 
  
Model Name
No. of Patient 
Years
Dependent 
Mean
R-square Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2009
p-values Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2010
p-values
I. Models of Total Medical  Spending, All Payers
1. All Controls 410,334        3,235          0.0026 -286 154 -8.8% 0.06 -318 198 -9.8% 0.11
2. Basic Difference-in-Difference 410,334        3,235          0.0023 -286 151 -8.8% 0.06 -327 201 -10.1% 0.10
II. By Physician Specialty
3. Primary Care Specialties Only 380,320        3,304          0.0026 -274 155 -8.3% 0.08 -301 198 -9.1% 0.13
4. Non-Pediatric Primary Care Specialties 263,132        3,398          0.0028 -328 160 -9.7% 0.04 -384 211 -11.3% 0.07
III. By Payer
5. Medicare Only 47,660          5,865          0.0057 -700 381 -11.9% 0.07 -533 382 -9.1% 0.16
6. Medicaid Only 40,074          1,645          0.0017 -223 190 -13.6% 0.24 10 298 0.6% 0.97
7. Privately Insured Only 322,600        2,943          0.0022 -233 138 -7.9% 0.09 -302 197 -10.3% 0.13
IV. By Place of Service
8. Inpatient Care 410,334        838             0.0007 -135 60 -16.0% 0.03 -157 86 -18.8% 0.07
9. Emergency Care 410,334        89               0.0003 -11 4 -12.3% 0.00 -7 5 -7.5% 0.22
10. Outpatient Care, and Other Care 410,334        2,280          0.0044 -140 95 -6.2% 0.14 -144 113 -6.3% 0.20
V. By Type of Service†
11. Evaluation & Management 410,334        687             0.0127 -32 7 -4.7% 0.00 -50 9 -7.3% 0.00
12. Procedures 410,334        800             0.0008 -72 40 -9.0% 0.07 -67 49 -8.4% 0.18
13. Imaging 410,334        364             0.0005 -25 11 -6.9% 0.02 -20 12 -5.6% 0.09
14. Tests 410,334        168             0.0008 -14 10 -8.6% 0.15 -27 12 -16.0% 0.03
15. Durable Medical Equipment 410,334        105             0.0002 -6 8 -5.7% 0.47 -1 32 -1.4% 0.96
16. Others 410,334        207             0.0015 -26 17 -12.5% 0.12 5 37 2.3% 0.90
Year 1 Effects (2009) Year 2 Effects (2010)
Notes: Each row is from a different regression. All models are weighted by months of eligibility and propensity scores. Standard errors are clustered for practice IDs. All models include individual 
fixed effects. In addition, models 5-7 include fixed effects for insurance type and plan type, while the remaining models include fixed effects for insurance type, plan type and payer type.  †Clinical 
categories designated according to the Berenson-Eggers Type of Service (BETOS) classification, version 2012, applied to professional claims only.
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Table 1.C.2: Treatment Effect Sensitivity Analysis Using Massachusetts Health Quality Project (MHQP) Primary Care 
Practitioner (PCP) Assignment and Propensity Weighting Using Lagged Prospective Risk Score, with Fixed PCP 
Assignment, and Including Entry and Exit
 
Model Name
No. of Patient 
Years
Dependent 
Mean
R-square Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2009
p-values Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2010
p-values
I. Models of Total Medical  Spending, All Payers
1. All Controls 692,270        3,211          0.0029 -239 178 -7.5% 0.18 -286 217 -8.9% 0.19
2. Basic Difference-in-Difference 692,270        3,211          0.0028 -238 172 -7.4% 0.17 -290 218 -9.0% 0.18
II. By Physician Specialty
3. Primary Care Specialties Only 623,836        3,292          0.0030 -235 181 -7.1% 0.20 -271 224 -8.2% 0.23
4. Non-Pediatric Primary Care Specialties 424,451        3,395          0.0033 -303 193 -8.9% 0.12 -375 242 -11.0% 0.12
III. By Payer
5. Medicare Only 58,961          6,923          0.0101 -911 422 -13.2% 0.03 -809 564 -11.7% 0.15
6. Medicaid Only 136,588        1,971          0.0013 -103 349 -5.2% 0.77 -65 302 -3.3% 0.83
7. Privately Insured Only 496,721        2,909          0.0024 -173 155 -6.0% 0.26 -235 206 -8.1% 0.25
IV. By Place of Service
8. Inpatient Care 692,270        920             0.0011 -150 93 -16.3% 0.11 -145 114 -15.7% 0.20
9. Emergency Care 692,270        100             0.0002 -13 4 -13.4% 0.00 -5 6 -4.5% 0.43
10. Outpatient Care, and Other Care 692,270        2,156          0.0041 -74 105 -3.5% 0.48 -116 109 -5.4% 0.29
V. By Type of Service†
11. Evaluation & Management 692,270        652             0.0113 -34 7 -5.2% 0.00 -49 8 -7.6% 0.00
12. Procedures 692,270        753             0.0008 -42 46 -5.6% 0.36 -59 52 -7.8% 0.26
13. Imaging 692,270        340             0.0006 -25 9 -7.5% 0.00 -19 14 -5.6% 0.17
14. Tests 692,270        158             0.0008 -10 13 -6.3% 0.43 -18 14 -11.3% 0.20
15. Durable Medical Equipment 692,270        98               0.0002 -4 9 -4.2% 0.65 3 24 3.2% 0.89
16. Others 692,270        212             0.0012 3 27 1.3% 0.92 4 41 2.0% 0.92
VI. By Categories of Eligibility
17. Eligible for at least one month each year 503,265        3,273          0.0030 -205 131 -6.3% 0.12 -262 198 -8.0% 0.19
18. Full 36 months eligibility (2008-2010) 410,334        3,245          0.0025 -266 155 -8.2% 0.09 -303 198 -9.3% 0.13
19. Less than 36 months eligibility (2008-2010) 281,936        3,140          0.0058 -153 367 -4.9% 0.68 -201 458 -6.4% 0.66
20. New Arrivers and Early Departers 189,005        3,003          0.0046 -417 528 -13.9% 0.43 -539 421 -17.9% 0.20
Notes: Each row is from a different regression. All models are weighted by months of eligibility and propensity scores. Standard errors are clustered for practice IDs. All models include individual 
fixed effects. In addition, models 5-7 include fixed effects for insurance type and plan type, while the remaining models include fixed effects for insurance type, plan type and payer type.  †Clinical 
categories designated according to the Berenson-Eggers Type of Service (BETOS) classification, version 2012, applied to professional claims only.
Year 1 Effects (2009) Year 2 Effects (2010)
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Table 1.C.3: Treatment Effect Sensitivity Analysis Using Massachusetts Health Quality Project (MHQP) Primary Care 
Practitioner (PCP) Assignment and Propensity Weighting Using Lagged Prospective Risk Score, with Changing PCP 
Assignment, and Including Entry and Exit 
 
Model Name
No. of Patient 
Years
Dependent 
Mean
R-square Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2009
p-values Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2010
p-values
I. Models of Total Medical  Spending, All Payers
1. All Controls 692,270        3,200          0.0031 -211 181 -6.6% 0.24 -251 252 -7.9% 0.32
2. Basic Difference-in-Difference 692,270        3,200          0.0030 -209 174 -6.5% 0.23 -252 253 -7.9% 0.32
II. By Physician Specialty
3. Primary Care Specialties Only 623,836        3,261          0.0031 -227 184 -7.0% 0.22 -278 257 -8.5% 0.28
4. Non-Pediatric Primary Care Specialties 424,451        3,387          0.0034 -294 194 -8.7% 0.13 -357 275 -10.6% 0.19
III. By Payer
5. Medicare Only 58,961          6,911          0.0100 -1027 563 -14.9% 0.07 -674 593 -9.8% 0.26
6. Medicaid Only 136,588        1,983          0.0014 51 328 2.6% 0.88 20 267 1.0% 0.94
7. Privately Insured Only 496,721        2,898          0.0025 -143 150 -5.0% 0.34 -230 235 -7.9% 0.33
IV. By Place of Service
8. Inpatient Care 692,270        913             0.0011 -149 78 -16.3% 0.05 -158 132 -17.3% 0.23
9. Emergency Care 692,270        99               0.0002 -10 4 -9.9% 0.01 -3 6 -3.3% 0.59
10. Outpatient Care, and Other Care 692,270        2,153          0.0043 -48 114 -2.2% 0.67 -73 123 -3.4% 0.55
V. By Type of Service†
11. Evaluation & Management 692,270        651             0.0116 -28 7 -4.3% 0.00 -46 7 -7.1% 0.00
12. Procedures 692,270        755             0.0009 -22 47 -3.0% 0.63 -35 61 -4.7% 0.56
13. Imaging 692,270        338             0.0006 -20 10 -5.8% 0.06 -15 16 -4.5% 0.35
14. Tests 692,270        158             0.0009 -7 13 -4.7% 0.57 -21 15 -13.5% 0.16
15. Durable Medical Equipment 692,270        96               0.0002 -3 9 -3.2% 0.74 -1 25 -0.6% 0.98
16. Others 692,270        213             0.0012 10 29 4.9% 0.73 14 46 6.7% 0.76
VI. By Categories of Eligibility
17. Eligible for at least one month each year 503,265        3,244          0.0030 -181 130 -5.6% 0.16 -226 235 -7.0% 0.34
18. Full 36 months eligibility (2008-2010) 410,334        3,222          0.0025 -251 158 -7.8% 0.11 -263 225 -8.2% 0.24
19. Less than 36 months eligibility (2008-2010) 281,936        3,153          0.0063 -42 333 -1.3% 0.90 -109 424 -3.4% 0.80
20. New Arrivers and Early Departers 189,005        3,049          0.0055 -342 534 -11.2% 0.52 -518 436 -17.0% 0.24
Year 1 Effects (2009) Year 2 Effects (2010)
Notes: Each row is from a different regression. All models are weighted by months of eligibility and propensity scores. Standard errors are clustered for practice IDs. All models include individual 
fixed effects. In addition, models 5-7 include fixed effects for insurance type and plan type, while the remaining models include fixed effects for insurance type, plan type and payer type.  †Clinical 
categories designated according to the Berenson-Eggers Type of Service (BETOS) classification, version 2012, applied to professional claims only.
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Table 1.C.4: Treatment Effect Sensitivity Analysis Using Capital District Physicians’ Health Plan (CDPHP) Primary 
Care Practitioner (PCP) Assignment and Propensity Weighting Using Lagged Prospective Risk Score, with Fixed 2008 
PCP Assignment, and Excluding Entry and Exit 
 
  
Model Name
No. of Patient 
Years
Dependent 
Mean
R-square Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2009
p-values Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2010
p-values
I. Models of Total Medical  Spending, All Payers
1. All Controls 304,260       3,422          0.0033 -197 175 -5.7% 0.26 -195 236 -5.7% 0.41
2. Basic Difference-in-Difference 304,260       3,422          0.0030 -197 172 -5.8% 0.25 -203 238 -5.9% 0.39
II. By Physician Specialty
3. Primary Care Specialties Only 294,562       3,377          0.0030 -211 177 -6.3% 0.23 -194 238 -5.7% 0.42
4. Non-Pediatric Primary Care Specialties 200,072       3,474          0.0033 -284 184 -8.2% 0.12 -266 251 -7.6% 0.29
III. By Payer
5. Medicare Only 40,545         6,009          0.0068 -531 427 -8.8% 0.21 -447 321 -7.4% 0.16
6. Medicaid Only 29,011         1,811          0.0034 -293 156 -16.2% 0.06 29 339 1.6% 0.93
7. Privately Insured Only 234,704       3,076          0.0030 -136 179 -4.4% 0.45 -156 260 -5.1% 0.55
IV. By Place of Service
8. Inpatient Care 304,260       845             0.0010 -100 70 -11.9% 0.16 -161 93 -19.1% 0.08
9. Emergency Care 304,260       92               0.0005 -11 5 -12.1% 0.02 0 6 -0.1% 0.99
10. Outpatient Care, and Other Care 304,260       2,457          0.0054 -89 113 -3.6% 0.43 -41 140 -1.7% 0.77
V. By Type of Service†
11. Evaluation & Management 304,260       747             0.0147 -21 12 -2.9% 0.09 -38 8 -5.1% 0.00
12. Procedures 304,260       852             0.0014 -27 47 -3.2% 0.56 -2 57 -0.2% 0.98
13. Imaging 304,260       391             0.0007 -19 15 -4.9% 0.20 -5 19 -1.2% 0.80
14. Tests 304,260       185             0.0008 -9 13 -4.9% 0.47 -20 16 -10.7% 0.23
15. Durable Medical Equipment 304,260       113             0.0002 -10 17 -9.2% 0.55 -8 34 -7.1% 0.81
16. Others 304,260       213             0.0020 -17 18 -8.0% 0.34 33 41 15.4% 0.42
Year 1 Effects (2009) Year 2 Effects (2010)
Notes: Each row is from a different regression. All models are weighted by months of eligibility and propensity scores. Standard errors are clustered for practice IDs. All models include individual fixed 
effects. In addition, models 5-7 include fixed effects for insurance type and plan type, while the remaining models include fixed effects for insurance type, plan type and payer type.  †Clinical categories 
designated according to the Berenson-Eggers Type of Service (BETOS) classification, version 2012, applied to professional claims only.
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Table 1.C.5: Treatment Effect Sensitivity Analysis Using Capital District Physicians’ Health Plan (CDPHP) Primary 
Care Practitioner (PCP) Assignment and Propensity Weighting Using Lagged Prospective Risk Score, with Fixed PCP 
Assignment, and Including Entry and Exit 
 
Model Name
No. of Patient 
Years
Dependent 
Mean
R-square Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2009
p-values Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2010
p-values
I. Models of Total Medical  Spending, All Payers
1. All Controls 573,476       3,261          0.0035 -164 189 -5.0% 0.39 -186 273 -5.7% 0.49
2. Basic Difference-in-Difference 573,476       3,261          0.0033 -163 177 -5.0% 0.36 -189 266 -5.8% 0.48
II. By Physician Specialty
3. Primary Care Specialties Only 549,373       3,204          0.0032 -169 190 -5.3% 0.37 -177 272 -5.5% 0.51
4. Non-Pediatric Primary Care Specialties 372,093       3,298          0.0035 -256 201 -7.8% 0.20 -276 291 -8.4% 0.34
III. By Payer
5. Medicare Only 54,306         6,819          0.0103 -1179 410 -17.3% 0.00 -1006 551 -14.8% 0.07
6. Medicaid Only 107,408       2,045          0.0017 -230 232 -11.3% 0.32 -270 376 -13.2% 0.46
7. Privately Insured Only 411,762       2,946          0.0029 -28 197 -1.0% 0.89 -62 317 -2.1% 0.84
IV. By Place of Service
8. Inpatient Care 573,476       886             0.0012 -120 85 -13.6% 0.16 -120 137 -13.5% 0.37
9. Emergency Care 573,476       100             0.0004 -12 5 -11.7% 0.01 1 143 0.9% 0.87
10. Outpatient Care, and Other Care 573,476       2,245          0.0049 -30 112 -1.3% 0.79 -52 6 -2.3% 0.71
V. By Type of Service†
11. Evaluation & Management 573,476       687             0.0128 -21 10 -3.0% 0.05 -38 8 -5.5% 0.00
12. Procedures 573,476       775             0.0012 -7 54 -0.9% 0.90 -25 64 -3.3% 0.69
13. Imaging 573,476       355             0.0006 -19 13 -5.4% 0.13 -12 19 -3.5% 0.51
14. Tests 573,476       167             0.0011 -4 15 -2.7% 0.76 -17 18 -10.0% 0.36
15. Durable Medical Equipment 573,476       99               0.0002 -9 11 -9.1% 0.40 -6 27 -6.5% 0.81
16. Others 573,476       208             0.0017 8 20 3.7% 0.69 37 39 17.6% 0.32
VI. By Categories of Eligibility
17. Eligible for at least one month each year 359,064       3,450          0.0037 -120 165 -3.5% 0.47 -156 244 -4.5% 0.52
18. Full 36 months eligibility (2008-2010) 304,260       3,404          0.0032 -168 175 -4.9% 0.34 -173 237 -5.1% 0.46
19. Less than 36 months eligibility (2008-2010) 269,216       3,058          0.0048 -155 215 -5.1% 0.47 -218 427 -7.1% 0.59
20. New Arrivers and Early Departers 214,412       2,905          0.0037 -321 506 -11.1% 0.53 -328 647 -11.3% 0.61
Notes: Each row is from a different regression. All models are weighted by months of eligibility and propensity scores. Standard errors are clustered for practice IDs. All models include individual fixed 
effects. In addition, models 5-7 include fixed effects for insurance type and plan type, while the remaining models include fixed effects for insurance type, plan type and payer type.  †Clinical categories 
designated according to the Berenson-Eggers Type of Service (BETOS) classification, version 2012, applied to professional claims only.
Year 1 Effects (2009) Year 2 Effects (2010)
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Table 1.C.6: Treatment Effect Sensitivity Analysis Using Capital District Physicians’ Health Plan (CDPHP) Primary 
Care Practitioner (PCP) Assignment and Propensity Weighting Using Lagged Prospective Risk Score, with Changing 
PCP Assignment, and Including Entry and Exit 
 
Model Name
No. of Patient 
Years
Dependent 
Mean
R-square Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2009
p-values Coefficient
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2010
p-values
I. Models of Total Medical  Spending, All Payers
1. All Controls 573,476       3,188          0.0032 -322 171 -10.1% 0.05 -332 278 -10.4% 0.23
2. Basic Difference-in-Difference 573,476       3,188          0.0031 -321 161 -10.1% 0.04 -330 273 -10.4% 0.23
II. By Physician Specialty
3. Primary Care Specialties Only 549,373       3,152          0.0030 -306 171 -9.7% 0.07 -271 275 -8.6% 0.32
4. Non-Pediatric Primary Care Specialties 372,093       3,275          0.0032 -373 181 -11.4% 0.03 -370 294 -11.3% 0.21
III. By Payer
5. Medicare Only 54,306         6,610          0.0097 -1640 440 -24.8% 0.00 -1237 667 -18.7% 0.06
6. Medicaid Only 107,408       2,011          0.0017 -259 271 -12.9% 0.32 -623 310 -31.0% 0.04
7. Privately Insured Only 411,762       2,895          0.0027 -166 164 -5.7% 0.30 -189 330 -6.5% 0.57
IV. By Place of Service
8. Inpatient Care 573,476       852             0.0010 -205 69 -24.1% 0.00 -220 124 -25.9% 0.08
9. Emergency Care 573,476       98               0.0004 -11 108 -11.2% 0.02 -1 5 -0.7% 0.91
10. Outpatient Care, and Other Care 573,476       2,212          0.0046 -97 5 -4.4% 0.37 -95 157 -4.3% 0.54
V. By Type of Service†
11. Evaluation & Management 573,476       679             0.0129 -29 9 -4.2% 0.00 -48 7 -7.0% 0.00
12. Procedures 573,476       765             0.0012 -27 55 -3.6% 0.61 -31 73 -4.0% 0.67
13. Imaging 573,476       349             0.0006 -25 10 -7.2% 0.01 -18 21 -5.1% 0.41
14. Tests 573,476       165             0.0010 -9 13 -5.6% 0.47 -21 19 -12.5% 0.28
15. Durable Medical Equipment 573,476       96               0.0002 -19 9 -19.7% 0.04 -15 28 -16.0% 0.58
16. Others 573,476       203             0.0015 -14 19 -6.7% 0.44 19 39 9.6% 0.62
VI. By Categories of Eligibility
17. Eligible for at least one month each year 359,064       3,352          0.0033 -305 131 -9.1% 0.02 -325 248 -9.7% 0.19
18. Full 36 months eligibility (2008-2010) 304,260       3,333          0.0028 -326 149 -9.8% 0.03 -291 241 -8.7% 0.23
19. Less than 36 months eligibility (2008-2010) 269,216       2,982          0.0046 -313 247 -10.5% 0.17 -432 360 -14.5% 0.23
20. New Arrivers and Early Departers 214,412       2,881          0.0037 -371 535 -12.9% 0.48 -358 711 -12.4% 0.61
Year 1 Effects (2009) Year 2 Effects (2010)
Notes: Each row is from a different regression. All models are weighted by months of eligibility and propensity scores. Standard errors are clustered for practice IDs. All models include individual fixed 
effects. In addition, models 5-7 include fixed effects for insurance type and plan type, while the remaining models include fixed effects for insurance type, plan type and payer type.  †Clinical categories 
designated according to the Berenson-Eggers Type of Service (BETOS) classification, version 2012, applied to professional claims only.
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Table 1.C.7: Treatment Effect Sensitivity Analysis Using Massachusetts Health Quality Project (MHQP) Primary Care 
Practitioner (PCP) Assignment and Propensity Weighting—Fixed at 2008—Using Lagged Prospective Risk Score, with 
Fixed 2008 PCP Assignment, and Excluding Entry and Exit 
Model Name
No. of 
Patient 
Years
Depende
nt Mean
R-square
Coefficie
nt
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2009
p-values
Coefficie
nt
Standard 
Error
% effect 
2010
p-values
I. Models of Total Medical  Spending, All Payers
1. All Controls 410,334   3,283    0.0021 -192 156 -5.9% 0.22 -247 198 -7.5% 0.21
2. Basic Difference-in-Difference 410,334   3,283    0.0018 -193 152 -5.9% 0.20 -258 199 -7.9% 0.20
II. By Physician Specialty
3. Primary Care Specialties Only 380,320   3,351    0.0022 -176 156 -5.3% 0.26 -227 197 -6.8% 0.25
4. Non-Pediatric Primary Care Specialties 263,132   3,439    0.0024 -240 162 -7.0% 0.14 -306 210 -8.9% 0.15
III. By Payer
5. Medicare Only 47,660     5,956    0.0046 -474 385 -8.0% 0.22 -301 387 -5.1% 0.44
6. Medicaid Only 40,074     1,683    0.0014 -189 196 -11.2% 0.33 48 297 2.9% 0.87
7. Privately Insured Only 322,600   2,981    0.0019 -154 140 -5.2% 0.27 -256 194 -8.6% 0.19
IV. By Place of Service
8. Inpatient Care 410,334   857       0.0005 -55 63 -6.4% 0.38 -81 87 -9.5% 0.35
9. Emergency Care 410,334   89         0.0003 -9 4 -10.5% 0.01 -6 5 -6.3% 0.30
10. Outpatient Care, and Other Care 410,334   2,307    0.0041 -130 96 -5.6% 0.17 -153 112 -6.6% 0.17
V. By Type of Service†
11. Evaluation & Management 410,334   690       0.0108 -24 8 -3.5% 0.00 -43 9 -6.2% 0.00
12. Procedures 410,334   811       0.0007 -65 40 -8.1% 0.10 -69 49 -8.5% 0.16
13. Imaging 410,334   367       0.0004 -21 11 -5.6% 0.06 -16 12 -4.5% 0.17
14. Tests 410,334   170       0.0007 -14 10 -8.0% 0.17 -26 12 -15.2% 0.04
15. Durable Medical Equipment 410,334   107       0.0002 -6 8 -5.5% 0.49 -1 31 -0.5% 0.99
16. Others 410,334   216       0.0014 -26 17 -12.1% 0.13 -2 37 -1.0% 0.95
Year 1 Effects (2009) Year 2 Effects (2010)
Notes: Each row is from a different regression. All models are weighted by months of eligibility and propensity scores. Standard errors are clustered for practice IDs. All 
models include individual fixed effects. In addition, models 5-7 include fixed effects for insurance type and plan type, while the remaining models include fixed effects for 
insurance type, plan type and payer type.  †Clinical categories designated according to the Berenson-Eggers Type of Service (BETOS) classification, version 2012, 
applied to professional claims only.
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2. Doctor Demand: The Impact of Online Reviews on Doctor Choice with 
Michael Luca 
2.1. Introduction 
Credence goods are products, with uncertain properties, whose quality cannot be 
fully judged by the consumer even after purchase and consumption (Darby and Karni, 
1973). This is especially true in the market for physicians where consumers face ex ante 
uncertainty regarding the quality of the treatment received and may rely on imperfect 
signals to infer quality. Traditionally, consumers have relied on social learning to resolve 
some of these information asymmetries. For example, consumers may ask their peers to 
recommend a physician. Even the National Institute for Aging tells patients to “ask 
people you trust” for physician recommendations. With the onset of social media 
revolution, consumers seeking physician recommendation can also learn from consumer 
review websites such as ZocDoc.com, where patients can share their experiences 
regarding visits to physicians. By enabling large-scale distribution of information from 
countless other consumers, these consumer review websites can help resolve information 
asymmetries among a much broader peer group than has been traditionally possible. This 
paper provides empirical evidence on the impact of patient-created reviews in the market 
for primary care physicians.  
It is not clear whether consumer review websites should significantly affect 
markets for credence goods. On the one hand, consumer review websites help fill the 
void left by the absence of any government or nonprofit agency assuming the role of 
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information provider on primary care physician quality. Consumer reviews can also 
complement or substitute for existing information—education, board certification, and 
malpractice claims—on physicians, some of which may not be easily available or 
understood by a lay person. On the other hand, a consumer writing a review cannot fully 
evaluate the treatment or service received, since he or she is unfamiliar with the 
intricacies of the medical knowledge possessed by the primary care physician. Further, 
patient-created reviews can be difficult to interpret—they reflect the views of a non-
representative sample of patients, and are subjective. Consumers must also actively look 
for consumer reviews, in contrast to mandatory disclosure, such as in the case of calorie 
posting in chain restaurants
1
, and electronic commerce settings, for example eBay.
2
  
Do online consumer reviews affect markets for credence good? Using a novel 
data set consisting of all reviews for physicians from ZocDoc.com, and data on 
appointments that are booked through ZocDoc, we present four key findings: (1) a half-
star increase in ZocDoc rating leads to a 10% increase in the likelihood, at the mean, that 
a physician will fill an appointment, (2) overall, no significant impact on how early an 
appointment gets filled, (3) on the supply side, physicians update the quantity of 
appointments supplied on ZocDoc in response to an increase in the likelihood of filling 
an appointment, (4) patient ratings capture patient's visit experience, and educational 
differences.  
                                                 
1
 See Bollinger et al. (2010). 
2
 See Luís and Hortaçsu (2010), Cabral and Hortaçsu (2010).  
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To construct the data set for this analysis, we gather all patient reviews written for 
primary care physicians in Manhattan, New York city, on the popular doctor reservation 
platform ZocDoc.com. We then pair these reviews with data on appointments that are 
booked through ZocDoc, during February-May, 2013. We focus on ZocDoc.com because 
it is a unique website that integrates patient reviews, and appointment scheduling for 
physicians on one platform. It is also the dominant player in online appointment 
scheduling, the appointment schedules of multiple physicians are made available on one 
single platform, making it convenient for consumers to compare physician rating, 
background information, appointment slots, and book appointment slots. For Manhattan, 
the website had over 600 physician information, covering about 25% of all actively 
practicing licensed primary care physicians as of May, 2013. ZocDoc is also one of the 
fastest growing website, in terms of the number of monthly unique visitors as measured 
by the IP addresses.  
To investigate the impact of ZocDoc, we first show that changes in a physician's 
rating are correlated with change in the likelihood of filling an appointment, controlling 
for physician characteristics, appointment characteristics, and zip level demographic 
information. However, if changes in a physician's rating are correlated with other changes 
in a physician's reputation that would have occurred even in the absence of ZocDoc then 
this relation cannot be satisfactorily interpreted as causal relationship.
3
 
                                                 
3
 See Eliashberg and Shugan (1997) for a detailed description of this problem. 
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To support the claim that ZocDoc has a causal impact on appointment filling 
likelihood, we exploit the institutional features of ZocDoc to isolate variation in a 
physician's rating that is exogenous with respect to unobserved determinants of 
appointment filling likelihood. In addition to individual reviews, ZocDoc presents the 
average rating for each physician, rounded to the nearest half-star. We implement a 
regression discontinuity (RD) design around the rounding thresholds, taking advantage of 
this feature. Essentially, we look for discontinuous jumps in appointment filling 
likelihood that follow discontinuous changes in rating. One common challenge to the RD 
methodology is gaming: in this setting, physicians may encourage their favored patients 
to submit positive reviews.
4
 We then implement the McCrary (2008) density test to rule 
out the possibility that gaming is biasing the results. If gaming were driving the result, 
then one would expect ratings to be clustered just above the discontinuities. However, 
this is not the case.  
Using the RD framework, we find that a physician's average rating has a large 
impact on appointment filling likelihood—a half star increase leads to a 10% increase in 
the likelihood of filling an appointment. The identification strategy used in this paper 
shows that ZocDoc affects demand, but is also informative about the way that consumers 
use information. If information is costless to use, then consumers should not respond to 
rounding, since they also see the underlying reviews. However, a growing literature has 
                                                 
4
 ZocDoc makes is almost impossible for physicians to submit fake reviews. Only patients who have been 
verified to have visited the physician after booking an appointment through ZocDoc are encouraged to 
leave feedback.  
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shown that consumers do not use all available information (Dellavigna and Pollet 2007; 
2010). Further, responsiveness to information can depend not only on the informational 
content, but also on the simplicity of calculating the information of interest (Chetty et al. 
2009, Finkelstein 2009). Moreover, many physicians on ZocDoc receive upward of two 
hundred reviews, making it time-consuming to read them all. Hence, the average rating 
may serve as a simplifying heuristic to help consumers learn about physician quality in 
the face of complex information. 
Next, we examine the impact of ZocDoc on how early an appointment gets filled. 
This will inform us on the way ZocDoc is used by consumers. ZocDoc claims that most 
of the appointments get booked within a 24-72 hour window. If cancelling an 
appointment is costless, consumers may want to lock-in a convenient appointment slot 
with their favorite physician early on. However, if cancellations are costly consumers 
may be discouraged to book appointments early on and look for last minute 
appointments. We find that out of the appointments that are filled almost 45% get filled 
in the last 24 hours. Though we find that ratings are positively correlated with when an 
appointment gets filled, we do not find satisfactory evidence that ratings have a causal 
impact on when an appointment gets filled. The RD estimates are not statistically 
significant for some of our specifications.  
We then investigate how physicians respond to the consumer demand on ZocDoc. 
Usually, physicians do not post all of their appointments on ZocDoc. There is a large 
scope for most physicians to make more of their appointment slots available through 
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ZocDoc. We find that the number of slots posted by a physician is positively correlated 
with the likelihood of the appointments getting filled in the last seven days.  
Overall, this paper presents evidence that consumers use ZocDoc to learn more 
about physicians. In health care markets, there is strong evidence that public disclosure of 
quality data has been effective in better matching patients with products and providers.
5
 
However, there is a serious downside risk, of selection by providers, due to these report 
cards.
6
 Risk-adjustment may not sufficiently compensate the risk-averse providers for the 
downside of treating sick patients. Since report cards are often based on small samples, 
the incentive problem get highlighted. Supporters of the report cards highlight the 
positive impact: patients can identify the best physicians, and providers have a powerful 
incentives to improve quality (Dranove and Satterthwaite, 1992). Though consumer 
reviews are not based on outcome measures, the fact that consumer review websites can 
aggregate large amount of information helps us get around the problem posed by the 
small sample size of consumer report cards. 
Our paper shows that consumer reviews can be used to solve the information 
assymetry in credence goods markets. Our study contributes to the empirical literature on 
quality and consumer choice in the crucial area of credence goods market.  
                                                 
5
 For an example of impact of report cards in insurance plan market see Dafny and Dranove (2008) and Jin 
and Sorensen (2006). and Bundorf et al. (2009). For an example of the impact of report cards on fertility 
clinics and hospitals see Bundorf et al. (2009), and Cutler et al. (2004) respectively. For an example of 
report cards on the demand of individual physicians see Wang et al. (2011). 
6
 Cardiac surgery report cards in New York and Pennsylvania led to selection by providers (Dranove et al., 
2003). Werner et al. (2009) and Lu (2012) find similar evidence with the Nursing Home Quality Initiative. 
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The outline of the paper is as follows: section 2 provides a description of 
ZocDoc.com, section 3 details the data construction process used for the paper, section 4 
summarizes the data, section 5 provides an outline of the empirical strategy, section 6 
documents the regression results, finally section 7 concludes. 
2.2. Background on ZocDoc 
ZocDoc, launched in 2007, is an online medical care search, and scheduling 
service available to patients free-of-charge. The website enables patients to search for 
physicians by insurance, location, specialty, procedure, hospital affiliation, gender, and 
languages spoken. Based on the selection criteria ZocDoc provides patients with a list of 
physicians, patients can view open slots in physicians' schedules and make an 
appointment online, without ever having to pick up the phone. About 40 percent of these 
appointments take place within 24 hours
7
, much faster than the average appointment wait 
time of 21 days.
8
 According to ZocDoc,
9
 most of the appointments happen in 24-72 hour 
window. ZocDoc appointment service was initially limited to dentists in Manhattan, now 
ZocDoc claims to serves 40 percent of the U.S. population across more than 1,800 cities. 
More than 2.5 million patients use ZocDoc to find doctors every month.  
                                                 
7 
Kaiser Health News, "More Patients Making Appointments Online As Doctors Embrace Web" 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2011/january/03/zocdoc.aspx (Accessed Nov. 19, 2012) 
8
 Merritt Hawkins & Associates in a 2009 survey of 1,162 medical offices in 5 specialties across 15 
metropolitan areas report an average wait period of 21 days. 
9
 http://www.zocdoc.com/aboutus 
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Figure 2.1-2.5 plot the search volumes using Google trends. The term “ZocDoc” 
has the highest rate of growth as compared to “HealthGrades”, “RateMDs”, etc. Figure 
2.6 displays how the ZocDoc website's opening page looks like. It shows how a patient 
looking for physicians on ZocDoc can use the website's search feature to obtain a list of 
specialist physicians who accept a particular health plan. For example, Figure 2.7 shows a 
snapshot of the list of primary care physicians in New York City with no restriction on 
the type of insurance they accept. This is the page that opens up after the search 
command; it displays the physician's photograph, practice address, rounded average 
rating, main specialty, medical degree, hospital affiliation, and all open slots in his 
appointment schedule for the current week. Clicking on any physician name takes the 
patient to the physician's profile page which displays additional information about the 
physician's education, specialty, languages spoken, types of insurance accepted, and also 
displays the detailed ratings and text reviews left by any patient. Figure 2.8 and Figure 
2.9 display an example of physician profile and the individual patient ratings as they 
appear on ZocDoc's physician profile page.  
ZocDoc does not charge anything from the patients, however physicians can 
choose to subscribe by paying a monthly subscription of $250. For each subscribing 
physician the website has a profile page with ‘verified’ credentials, and most importantly 
patient–submitted reviews and ratings. Subscribing physicians benefit by attracting new 
patients, and by filling the last minute cancellations and postponements (10-20 percent of 
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total appointments)
10
 by ZocDoc patients. The automated reservation system cuts back on 
the time it takes to schedule an appointment, allowing staff to focus on serving the 
patients present at the practice.  
After the appointment ZocDoc emails a thank-you note, encouraging patients to 
review and rate (from 1-5 stars) their physicians for bedside manner, wait time and 
overall impression. The patient can then rate the physician they visited and can also enter 
a text review. ZocDoc also asks permission to use patient's name and appointment date in 
the review that will be displayed on the physician's webpage (Figure 2.10). Once a 
review is written, anyone (with or without an account) can access the website for free and 
read the review. Patients will come across reviews within the context of the search for a 
physician. This allows the patients, looking for physicians on ZocDoc, to compare and 
assess them on common quality characteristics. Since each verified patient is encouraged 
to leave a review, it may not be that patients who have had extreme experiences, and who 
are proactive, are the only ones to leave reviews. There is an implicit selection bias to 
websites that depend on the user to actively engage the review site and write a review, 
sometimes positive ratings are written by physicians themselves (Lagu et al., 2010), and 
negative ratings are by disgruntled employee, an ex-spouse, or a competitor (Segal, 
2009). By bundling review requests with appointments ZocDoc reduces the selection bias 
that limits the value of physician  ratings.  
                                                 
10
 ZocDoc’s co-founder and CEO Cyrus Massoumi, http://blogs.webmd.com/health-reform-
101/2012/05/doctors-appointments-just-a-click-away.html. 
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2.3. Data Construction 
Using ZocDoc.com we generated a unique data set containing physician's 
appointment schedules and professional information.  For the purpose of this study we 
focus on Primary Care Physicians in Manhattan, one of the five boroughs (municipal 
corporations) in the city of New York. Using ZocDoc's search engine, we first compile a 
list of Primary Care Physicians in Manhattan that subscribe to ZocDoc's scheduling 
service.
11
 For each physician that belonged to this list we download
12
 their appointment 
schedule—for the next seven days13—available at the ZocDoc website. We also 
downloaded detailed physician profile as well as each individual rating and text review. 
This exercise was repeated daily at 6:00am in the morning over approximately a period of 
three months, from February 24, 2013 to May 11, 2013.
14
 Each day we downloaded the 
following information: 
 All open appointment date and time slots for the next seven calendar days. 
 Physician's Personal Information 
o Education: Medical School and Residency 
                                                 
11
 We use the programming language Active Perl 1.4 for this step. 
12
 The appointment data is downloaded in a text format using the programming language Python 2.7. 
13
 We also attempted to download longer time horizon for available appointment data. We downloaded all 
open appointment date and time slots for the next twenty-eight days for the period between March 28, 2013 
to April 11, 2013, however we had to abort the longer horizon data collection due to frequent website 
updates by ZocDoc. 
14
 Our data collection ended on May 11, 2013. In the month of May, ZocDoc started making changes to the 
various HTML elements of the website. These changes typically went online in the middle of the night, 
which gave us only a few hours to update our code before the scheduled run at 6:00am.  We had to abort 
the data download process after May 11, 2013 due to frequent changes on the website which were creating 
interruptions in the daily data download process making it difficult to observe the daily changes in the 
appointment schedule.   
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o Hospital Affiliations 
o Languages spoken 
o Board Certifications 
o Awards and Publications 
o Specialties 
 Practice address 
 Rounded average physician rating as displayed on physicians profile page 
 In-network insurance 
 ZocDoc Physician Awards:- These awards located on a physician's profile page 
inform the patients about the physician's strength on ZocDoc helping them to 
make an informed choice. These physician awards are,  
o Rapid registration:- Provides digital registration forms to be filled online 
through ZocDoc Check_in.  
o See You Again:- If a large number of ZocDoc patients book repeatedly 
with a physician. 
o Speedy Response:- Physicians who confirm their appointments within one 
business hour even for same day appointments 
o Scheduling Hero:-Physicians who keep their schedule and in-network 
insurances up-to-date 
 Individual patient rating and review information for each physician 
o Patient name if disclosed by patient 
o Date when the rating was given 
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o Number of star ratings under the following categories 
 Overall 
 Bedside manner 
 Wait Time 
o Text Reviews 
We further augment the ZocDoc data by physician practice zip code level 
demographic information from the American Community Survey (ACS) available from 
US Census Bureau website. We download information on age, sex, race, family, 
household income, education, where you work and how you get there, and where you live 
for each zip code in our data set. We specifically use zip code level age and racial 
distribution, household income, percentage of population working from home, average 
family size, percentage of households as married-couple families, educational attainment 
of the population, and percentage of population in the same house as a year ago in our 
analysis.  
2.4. Data Description 
We began with a list of 697 physicians but after merging the physician profile 
data with the daily appointment data we are left with a subset of 411 physicians. This is 
because over the period of downloading the data set many physicians had no 
appointments available for our download window of 77 days. Finally out of 411 
physicians 14 physicians do not authorize ZocDoc to reveal their rating data for the entire 
period of our download window, therefore we are left we a sample of 397 physicians for 
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our analysis.15 According to the data on all actively practicing primary care physician in 
New York maintained by School of Public Health, University at Albany there were 2,599 
actively practicing primary care physicians (General Practice, and Internal Medicine) in 
New York, in 2010.16 This means that 18 percent of the primary care physician 
population in new York is on ZocDoc. 
2.4.1. Physician Profile 
Out of a total of 397 physicians around 59 percent physicians state their primary 
specialty as internal medicine, while 27 percent of physicians state either primary care, or 
family medicine. As reported in table 2.2, close to 40 percent of the physicians are 
female, while around 45 percent of the physicians have a non-US medical degree. Most 
physicians have a board certification, close to 70 percent are affiliated to a hospital while 
48 percent are affiliated to a teaching hospital. Around 28 percent of physicians list at 
least one award or publication. Spanish is the second language most often spoken by the 
physicians, around 45 percent of the physicians speak Spanish. Among the variety of 
languages spoken by the physicians—we have more than 15 language groups—Russian 
and related languages, French, and Chinese are the other notable ones.  
In our sample 3 physicians accept no insurance, i.e., they accept only private 
payment. Of the remaining physicians all accept Preferred Provider Organization plans 
                                                 
15
 The theory on quality data disclosure (Grossman, 1981; Board, 2009; Jin, 2005) suggests that providers 
who have not been competing on quality may be reluctant to call attention to their quality differences. 
16
 http://chws.albany.edu/archive/uploads/2013/09/nys_health_workforce_planning_data_guide_2013.pdf. 
Accessed October 10, 2013. 
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(PPO), while more than 95 percent accept each of the following: Health Maintenance 
Organization (HMO), Point-of-Service (POS), Exclusive Provider Organization (EPO), 
and Open Access plans. Out of the physicians who accept insurance, on average a 
physician accepts 72 different insurance providers, i.e., on average 72 different insurance 
providers are in a physician's network. Out of all physicians who accept insurance plans 
more than 80 percent accept Medicaid, and about 96 percent accept Medicare and all 
accept private insurance plans. 
Majority of physicians (around 63 percent) are running their own single physician 
practices. More than 52 percent of physicians provide digital registration forms to be 
filled online through ZocDoc Check_In and around 72 percent of physicians confirm 
their appointments within one business hour even for same day appointments. 
2.4.2. Physician Rating Data 
 ZocDoc displays the physician's rating at two different levels—the physician's 
rounded average rating for overall impression, and the individual patient ratings for each 
quality indicator, i.e., bedside manner, wait time and overall impression. The physician's 
rounded average rating for overall impression, which we download for our analysis, is 
what is displayed next to the physician's name and photograph (Figure 2.7 and Figure 
2.8). These prominently displayed ratings are average rating for overall impression that 
are rounded to the nearest half star. For example, a physician with an average rating of 
4.74 on overall impression will be rounded down to 4.5 stars, while a physician with 
average rating of 4.75 stars will be rounded up to 5 stars, This variation in average rating 
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that is displayed to the patients is exogenous to physician quality and can be exploited for 
a regression discontinuity analysis. These two physicians (with average rating of 4.74 and 
4.75) have comparable average rating for overall impression but have a half-star gap in 
what is actually displayed to a patient who is comparing physicians on ZocDoc before 
booking an appointment.  
As stated before, all historical patient rating on each of the three quality indicators 
and the text review data are also displayed on the profile page of each physician (Figure 
2.8) which we  download for our analysis. For the overall impression category we find 
that most patients give their physicians a favorable rating, minimum average rating is 2.8 
(Figure 2.11)
17
. Around 94 percent of the physicians have an average rating of 4 stars or 
more, while 18 percent of physicians have a perfect 5 star average rating. On average a 
physician receives overall impression rating from 68 unique patients. The number of 
patient reviews ranges between a between 1 and 1164 on May 11, 2013. We find that 
there is a small positive correlation of 0.2 between number of reviews and ratings. Total 
number of reviews received by a physician can be an important signal of a physician's 
popularity on ZocDoc. While looking at the number of reviews we find that the 
distribution of reviews by their overall rating bins is still skewed to the right but the 
skewness is reduced when compared to the distribution of physicians by the same rating 
                                                 
17
  The figure is based on a distribution of ratings on the last day of our data collection exercise, the average 
ratings for individual doctors do change over the course of our data collection, as new reviews are 
available, however the distribution of ratings on different days in our sample are quantitatively similar. 
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bins. More than 74 percent of patients who leave a rating after their appointment give a 
rating of 4.7 or more, but less than 17 percent give a perfect rating of 5 star.  
When we look at other rating categories we find that the distribution of rating on 
bedside manner mimics the rating distribution for overall impression while the 
distribution of rating for wait time is quite different from distribution of overall 
impression and bedside. For wait time rating, close to 25 percent of the physicians are 
rated between 3 to 3.9 stars while physicians with 5 star rating are only around 5 percent 
of the sample. This is quite different from the ratings on overall impression and bedside 
manner. For overall impression only 5 percent of physicians are rated between 3 to 3.9 
stars and as noted before 94 percent of the physicians have an average rating of 4 stars or 
more. When we look at the correlation between different rating categories we find that 
rating for bedside manner and overall impression are highly correlated (correlation value 
= 0.83), while the correlation between wait time and overall impression is almost half, at 
0.44. Similarly, the correlation between bedside manner and wait time is comparatively 
quite low at 0.31.  
In addition to rating their physicians, patients can leave text reviews describing in 
detail their visit, the conduct of the physician, the staff, and other practice features that 
the patient would like to bring attention to.  We quantified this text data by identifying 
positive and negative words that are used in the description. An example of some of the 
positive words used to describe the visit are: professional, absolutely recommend, 
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cooperative, down-to-earth.
18
 Similarly, some of the negative words used to describe the 
data are: cluttered, cold, disrespectful, horrible.
19
  
Comparing rating data across different categories of physicians we find that male 
physicians have a slightly higher average rating (4.58 stars) for overall impression as 
compared to that for females (4.52), but this difference is not statistically significant. The 
physicians with a US medical degree are rated 4.62 for overall impression as compared to 
4.48 for physicians trained outside US, and we find this difference to be statistically 
significant at 1 percent level. Physicians who are board certified have an average rating 
for overall impression of 4.57 stars compared to 4.51 stars for physicians who are not, 
though this difference is not statistically significant. Similarly the physicians who are 
affiliated to a hospital have a higher rating as compared to physicians who are not 
                                                 
18
 The complete list of positive words are—100% recommend, absolutely recommend, accessable, 
accommodating, actually recommended, Already recommended, amazing, and recommend, answered, 
approachable, articulate, attentive, awesome, called (should this be included?), cares, Caring, certainly 
recommend, clean, comfortable, compassionate, Completely recommend, cooperative, courteous, cozy, def 
recommend, Definitely recommended, detailed, do recommend, down-to-earth, efficient, encouraging, 
enjoyable, excellent, explained, Extremely recommended, fantastic, friendly, fully recommend, gentle, 
genuine, glad, gladly recommend, good, great, happily recommend, happy, have recommended, heartedly 
recommend, helpful, HIGHLY recommend, Honest, humble, I recommend, I'd recommend, impressed, 
informative, I've recommended, knowledgeable, listens, nice, patient, personable, pleasant, pleasure, polite, 
positive, professional, really recommend, relaxing, respectful, satisfied, satisfying, sensitive, sincere, smart, 
strongly recommend, surely recommend, sweet, sympathetic, thorough, thoroughly, thoughtful, totally 
recommend, transparent, very apologetic, very friendly, Very kind, very well, Veryrefreshing, warm, 
welcoming, well-spoken, wholeheartedly recommend, will recommend, Wonderful, Would recommend, 
yes recommend. 
19
 The complete list of negative words are—abrasive, abrupt, alarmist, aloof, annoyed, annoying, Awful, 
blunt, brusque, Can't recommend, cannot recommend, cluttered, cold, condescending, couldn't recommend, 
Didn't apologize, dingy,  disappointed, disappointing, disgruntled, dismissive, disorganized, disrespectful, 
don't recommend, embarrassing, go somewhere else, HORRIBLE, indifferent, intimidating, irritated, never 
recommend, NEVER recommend, never returning, non Clean, not recommend, not recommend, not 
returning, not very welcoming, not worth, quick, Rude, rushed, scared, shabby, shocked, Strange, Terrible, 
unapologetic, uncomfortable, unhelpful, unnecessary tests, unorganized, unpolite, unprofessional, 
unskillful, vague, weirdo, wouldn't recommend. 
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affiliated to a hospital but again this difference is not statistically significant. Finally, the 
physicians who have stated receiving any award or publication are rated higher at 4.62 
stars for overall impression as compared to physicians who do not list any ( 4.54). This 
difference is statistically significant at 10 percent level.   Table 2.3 reports the results of a 
simple regression of overall  rating on  bedside manner rating, wait time rating, physician 
profile variables (gender of doctor, dummy variables for  US medical degree, awards and 
publications, and teaching hospital affiliation), and ZocDoc Physician awards. The 
regression shows that apart from bedside manner rating and wait time rating, the only 
other significant variable is US medical Degree. Having US medical degree has a positive 
and significant impact of average physician rating.  
2.4.3. Appointment Data 
As explained before every day we are downloading all available open slots in a 
physician's appointment schedule for the next seven days. On a given day (t) we observe 
the appointment slots that are still open for that day, these slots are labeled as "not filled." 
We also observe the slots that are available for the next six days, t+1 to t+6. The data on 
available slots for next six days, can be compared with the data that will be downloaded 
on those days.  
For example, on day (t) we observe the appointment slots that are open for day 
t+1, some of these slots would still be open when we download data next day, and some 
will no longer be available. The slots that are no longer available are labeled as "filled," 
further we know that these slots were filled in last 24 hours.  
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Using the appointment data we construct the following variables 
 Appointment Filled: 
 
                                                             
                                                                 
   
 Appointment Time: Time of the day corresponding to the appointment slot 
 Appointment Date and Day of the week 
 Appointment Filled Day 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                           
 
 
 
 
  
There are 200,383 number of appointments made available by the physicians 
through ZocDoc for the period of our observation of 77 days which means on average 
each physician lists 7 slots on any given day while the total number of slots listed on any 
given day by all physicians is around 2600. We find that the appointment slots are 
uniformly distributed among the week days, there are appointment slots available for 
weekends but they add up to less than 10 percent of the total number of appointment 
slots.  
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The appointment slots are uniformly distributed during the day with a drop in the 
number of slots after 4 pm (Figure 2.12, panel A). The earliest appointment slot available 
during the data download period is at 6am and the last appointment slot is available for 
9.45pm. Out of 200,383 appointments being made available during the period of our 
observation we observe 90,539 appointments getting filled, i.e., 45 percent of the 
appointments posted on ZocDoc are getting filled. While looking at the appointment 
times we find that the appointments before 10am have the highest probability of getting 
filled, i.e., 85 percent, it declines to 55 percent for appointments between 10-11am, 
remains uniformly distributed for later hours and then drops to less than 20 percent for 
appointments after 6pm (Figure 2.12, panel B). We find that out of the appointments that 
get filled, about 45 percent are filled within 24 hours of the posted appointment time 
(Figure 2.13).  
2.5. Empirical Strategy 
We first establish the relationship between physician's rating for average overall 
impression and the probability of filling an appointment on ZocDoc. Next using a 
regression discontinuity approach we test the hypothesis that the ratings have a causal 
impact on the probability of filling an appointment. We next estimate the impact of rating 
on the quickness of filling an appointment. Finally, we estimate the nature of physician 
feedback in terms of supply of new appointments in response to the booking of their 
appointments. 
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2.5.1. Impact of Ratings and Reviews on Appointments 
To identify the effect of ratings and reviews on appointments we estimate the 
following model, where   is a physician, and   is an appointment.  
                                     
       
      
     (ii) 
      
                                                             
                                                                 
  
 r1it-7 is the average rating for overall impression for a physician, lagged by 7 days 
 r2it-7 is the lagged number of reviews received by the physician (we normalize the 
number of reviews by the series standard deviation) 
    
  are the physician specific variables, like gender, languages spoken, education, 
etc.  
    
  are the appointment specific variables, like appointment time of the day and 
appointment day of the week.  
 z'i are the zip code level variables on racial distribution, age distribution, income, 
family size, etc. 
2.5.2. Regression Discontinuity Framework 
For any given day the average physician rating for overall impression that is 
displayed to the patients is rounded by ZocDoc to the nearest half star. This introduces an 
exogenous variation in a physician's rating. For example, a physician with a 3.24 average 
rating will be rounded to 3 stars, while a physician with 3.25 stars will be rounded to 3.5 
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stars. To analyze the impact of this exogenous variation we look at observations with 
similar underlying rating but a difference of half star in their rating that is displayed to the 
patients. We first restrict our sample to observations with less than 0.1 star distance from 
the discontinuity or the rounding threshold which in this example is 3.25 star. We define 
a binary variable T: 
     
                                                                      
                                                                          
  
For example, T=0 if the rating ϵ (3.20, 3.25), since a patient looking to book an 
appointment would see 3 stars as the average rating. Similarly, T=1 if rating ϵ (3.25, 
3.30), since the patient would see 3.5 stars as the average rating. 
We will estimate the following model: 
                                          
       
      
          
(iii) 
where θ is the coefficient of interest. It tells us the impact of an exogenous change 
in a physician's rating on revenue, θ tells us the impact of moving from below the 
discontinuity to above it. The remaining variables are as defined in the previous section. 
We also estimate this model for bandwidths 0.2, 0.3, and 0.4. 
2.5.3. Speed of Appointment Filled 
We next estimate the impact of rating on how many days prior to an appointment 
date does an appointment finally gets filled. We first estimate the following model 
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without the threshold dummy Tit to establish the correlation between the speed of 
appointment getting filled and the ratings. We then estimate the following model to 
establish the causality. 
                                     
       
      
        (iv) 
where Sit is the number of days prior to an open appointment that appointment 
finally gets filled. 
2.5.4. Supply of Appointments on ZocDoc 
As the physician observes his appointments getting filled he might start offering 
more slots for a given day on ZocDoc. Since we are downloading our data every day we 
can observe if there is any change in the total number of appointments that any physician 
makes available on ZocDoc. Therefore, we estimate the following equation 
         
          
                  
      
           (v) 
where      
 
 is the number of appointments offered on date   as a proportion of 
average number of appointments offered in last k days.      
  the probability of filling the 
appointment in last k days. We estimate this model for k=7 and k=14 days. 
2.6. Results 
Table 2.4 reports the marginal effects of a simple probit regression, where the 
dependent variable is equal to 1 if appointment is filled and is equal to 0 if the 
appointment is open. The regression in column (1) includes average rating for overall 
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impression as the only explanatory variables. The results suggests that ratings have a 
significant impact on the probability of getting an appointment filled. A one point 
increase in average rating for overall impression on a five point scale leads to 9 percent 
increase in the probability of filling an appointment. Regression in column (2) includes 
the standardized number of overall ratings along with average overall ratings, both 
variables have significant and positive impact on the probability of filling an 
appointment. In Column (3) we introduce two variables that describe the content of the 
text reviews. These are the percentage of negative and positive key words in each doctor's 
text reviews out of the total word count of the reviews. As one would expect the negative 
key words words have a negative impact on the physician's probability of getting an 
appointment filled while the positive key words positively affect the physician's 
probability of getting an appointment filled. The results of the regression presented in 
column (4) control for information on the physician in addition to the rating variables, as 
well as for the time slot and day of the week for each appointment. Notable findings are 
that female physicians have a higher probability of getting an appointment filled, and 
early morning appointment slots are more likely to get filled as compared to the afternoon 
and evening appointments. Regression in column (5) adds the zip level variables from the 
ACS. To summarize the results in table 2.4, one point increase in average rating for 
overall impression on a five point scale leads to 6 percent to 10 percent increase in the 
probability of filling an appointment. Higher number of reviews also have a positive 
impact on future demand and female primary care doctors have a higher chance of filling 
an appointment. In figure 2.14 and 2.15 we plot the residuals from marginal probit 
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regression (5) reported in table 2.4. Figure 2.15 plots the residuals averaged within 0.1 
rating bins, and Figure 2.16 does the same for bin size to 0.05. All physicians with at 
least 5 reviews are included in the regression, 4.25 and 4.75 are the two discontinuity 
points. We see a sharp jump at 4.25 but not much effect at 4.75. 
As previously stated ZocDoc prominently displays a physician's rounded average 
rating for overall impression; however we observe the exact average rating by 
aggregating the individual patient ratings that we download with our data. Using the 
exact average rating we can identify the causal impact of ZocDoc ratings on demand with 
a regression discontinuity framework that exploits ZocDoc's rounding threshold. Table 
2.5, reports the regression discontinuity results. We find that artificially inflating the 
rating of a physician increases the probability of filling an appointment. In Table 2.5, 
Panel A, we report the results for bandwidth size 0.1, i.e. we focus on 0.05 differences in 
the average actual rating from the either side of the discontinuity. We further examine 
bandwidth of size 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4. As further evidence in support of our hypothesis we 
present the results for bandwidth 0.4 in Panel B of Table 2.5. The results for alternative 
bandwidth sizes, including those for 0.2 and 0.3 which are not presented in the chapter, 
are similar. We find that a different bandwidth selection mimics the result from those for 
bandwidth size 0.1. The regression discontinuity approach provides further support to the 
hypothesis that higher physician ratings as a measure of the quality have a positive 
impact on the probability of filling open appointment slots.  
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A possible bias in regression discontinuity results could arise, if the doctors that 
benefit from ZocDoc by getting more of their appointments filled are more likely to game 
the system. We test for the evidence of gaming hypothesis based on a test offered by 
McCrary (2008). If the doctors were gaming ZocDoc ratings, one would expect to see a 
disproportionately large number of doctors just above the rounding thresholds. Following 
Luca (2011) the variable of interest is the average rating after each review. Under the 
hypothesis of gaming, there should be “too many” observations with ratings just above 
rounding thresholds. To formally test for this, we count the number of observations for 
each 0.05 star interval, and compute the probability mass for each interval. We create a 
binary variable to indicate bins that fall just above a rounding threshold (e.g., 4.25-4.3 
stars, 4.75-4.8 stars). The dependent variable is the probability mass, and the independent 
variable is the indicator for bins that fall just above the discontinuity. Table 2.6 presents 
the results of this test. The test does not find any clustering of doctors just above the 
discontinuity, suggesting that manipulation is not an issue with the regression 
discontinuity design. 
We next examine the impact of physician ratings on the speed at which the 
appointments get filled. In other words do the physicians who have higher ratings see 
their appointments getting filled earlier than the other physicians? If the higher rated 
doctors get their slots filled faster; a patient looking for a physician has the option of 
either taking an appointment with a lower rated doctor without wait, or wait some extra 
time for a doctor with higher rating. We run a simple OLS regression the results of which 
are presented in Table 2.7. The dependent variable is distance in days of the appointment 
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filled date from the actual appointment date. We expect a longer wait time for a doctor 
with higher rating. We run parallel regression to the ones reported in table 2.4. For all the 
variable combinations we find that the physicians who have higher ratings see their 
appointments getting filled much earlier. Again female doctors fill up their appointment 
quicker. Appointment slots for Monday and earlier part of the week get filled relatively 
quickly. We also examine this hypothesis in a regression discontinuity setting; table 2.8 
reports the results for bandwidth of 0.1. While we find that rounding up the average 
physician rating leads to an increase on speed at which the appointments get filled, 
however the results are not statistically significant.   
Finally we explore the supply of appointments on ZocDoc. We ask whether 
physicians who see their appointments getting filled offer more appointments in future. 
We compare the number of appointments offered on date t with number of appointments 
7 days earlier. Our dependent variable is the number of appointments on date t as a 
proportion of average supply in the last 7 days i.e., in the last t-1 to t-7 days. We include 
as an independent variable the probability of filling an appointment in the last 7 days. We 
find that physicians increase their supply of appointments between 6 to 9 percent when 
they see a 1 percent increase in the probability of filling their appointments (see Table 
2.9). Similarly, we estimate the model while comparing the appointment offered on date t 
with those offered in the two weeks prior, i.e., from t-1 to t-14. We find that the impact 
on the supply of appointments is between 4 to 6 percent (see Table 2.10). Clearly 
physicians are responding to successful use of ZocDoc by offering more appointments on 
the system. 
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2.7. Discussion 
As the reach of internet grows we see more and more industries using World 
Wide Web for improving their services. Websites like Amazon and eBay have become 
widely used. It is high time that the health care providers benefit from the potential 
efficiency of the information revolution. In this regard ZocDoc is the first player who is 
trying to create an online market for physician services, with an intention of helping 
consumers to make an informed choice regarding the quality of health care provider. 
Further Zocdoc gives us a peek into how an online market of physician services can be 
organized and gives us an opportunity to draw lessons from this experiment.  
In this chapter we aim to understand ZocDoc and the market for physician 
services that it creates. Using ZocDoc.com this chapter analyzes a unique data set 
containing physician's appointment schedules, professional information, and ratings and 
reviews of former patients. We download the physician data available on ZocDoc every 
day at 6am in the morning beginning February 24 and ending May 11 of 2013. We find 
that ratings are positively correlated with changes in physician's ability to get more 
appointments booked through ZocDoc. To support the claim that ratings can have a 
causal impact on the appointments getting booked we use the exogenous variability of 
physician's rating as a tool allowing us to implement the regression discontinuity feature. 
In addition to specific reviews and ratings ZocDoc presents the average overall rating for 
each physician rounded to the nearest star. We implement a regression discontinuity 
design around the rounding threshold, taking advantage of this feature. We also show that 
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higher rated doctors get their appointment filled quickly. We find evidence that doctors 
that get their last minute appointments filled through ZocDoc tend to put more of their 
open slots on the Web. In future we would expect ZocDoc to expand in more cities and 
more physicians making their appointment available online through ZocDoc. 
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Table 2.1: ZocDoc - Physician Profile Information 
 
Note: Table 2.1 shows the average overall rating and frequency distribution of physicians by gender, 
education, board certification, hospital affiliation and publications/awards. Male physicians have a slightly 
higher average rating (4.58 stars) for overall impression as compared to that for females (4.52), but this 
difference is not statistically significant. US educated physicians have a higher average rating (4.62) for 
overall impression as compared to physician with non-US medical degree (4.48), this difference is 
statistically significant. While board certified physicians have a slightly higher average rating (4.57) for 
overall impression as compared to that for non-board certified (4.51), this difference is not statistically 
significant. We do not find statistically significant difference between the average overall rating for 
physicians with or without hospital affiliation, though getting an award or publication seems to matter.  
  
Population (%)
Average 
Overall Rating
t-test for 
difference in 
means (p-values)
Gender
Male 61 4.58
Female 39 4.52
Education
US Medical Degree 55 4.62
Non-US Medical Degree 45 4.48
Board Certification
Certified 80 4.57
Not Certified 20 4.51
Hospital Affiliation
Affiliated 69 4.57
Not Affiliated 31 4.54
Publications/Awards
At Least One 27 4.62
None 73 4.54
0.17
0.001
0.275
0.518
0.09
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Table 2.2: Population Characteristics of Manhattan Doctors 
 
Note: Table 2.2 shows the population characteristics of physicians in Manhattan with an active license to 
practice medicine in New York State. Data on the physicians is obtained from New York State Physician 
Profile Website (http://www.nydoctorprofile.com/) which has profile information on all licensed doctors of 
medicine and osteopathy who are registered to practice medicine in New York State.  
  
Primary Care 
(N=2035)
All Specialty 
(N=6147)
US Medical Degree 28 25
Board Certified 91 90
Hospital Affiliation 86 78
Affiliated to a Teaching Hospital 54 56
               Population (%)
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Table 2.3: Determinants of Physician's Overall Rating 
Dependent Variable: Physician's Average Overall Rating 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Avg. Bedside Manner Rating 0.914*** 0.856*** 0.861*** 0.869***
(0.045) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043)
Avg. Wait Time Rating 0.252*** 0.123*** 0.100*** 0.088**
(0.047) (0.031) (0.034) (0.036)
Physician Profile Variables
Female 0.008 0.014
(0.019) (0.019)
US Medical Degree 0.077*** 0.064***
(0.026) (0.023)
Any Award or Publication 0.043* 0.045*
(0.024) (0.024)
Affiliated to Teaching Hospital 0.013 0.016
(0.018) (0.020)
ZocDoc's Physician Awards
Rapid Registration 0.107** 0.047*
(0.052) (0.026)
Scheduling Hero 0.054 0.020
(0.045) (0.025)
See You Again 0.031 -0.024
(0.045) (0.026)
Speedy Response 0.045 -0.006
(0.067) (0.034)
Constant 0.333 3.503*** 0.085 4.390*** 0.098 0.092
(0.209) (0.205) (0.213) (0.076) (0.213) (0.210)
No. of Physicians 397 397 397 397 397 397
Adj R2 0.644 0.154 0.678 0.0391 0.693 0.700
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Table 2.4: Marginal Effects in a Probit Regression 
Dependent Variable = 1 (if an appointment is filled); 0 (if an appointment is open) 
 
Note: Numbers in bracket are standard errors clustered for physician IDs.  ***, **, * denote significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The unit of observation is an appointment. Bad (Good) key words are 
expressed as percentage of total text review word count. Zip level demographic variables are from 
American Community Survey (2011). The zip level demographic variables included are Hispanic (%), 
White (%), Asian (%), Age 21-64 (%), Age 65+ (%), Works from Home (%), Median Household Income 
(Standardized~(0,1)), Married-Couple Families (%), Average Family Size, Bachelor Degree of Higher (%), 
and Same Residence as 1 year ago (%). 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Avg. Overall Rating (Scale: 1 to 5) 0.094*** 0.073*** 0.056** 0.104*** 0.103***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
No. of Patient Reviews (Standardized~(0,1)) 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.032*** 0.025***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Text Review Variables
Bad Key Words (%) -0.032** -0.002 -0.007
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Good Key Words (%) 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Physician Profile Variables
Female 0.084*** 0.080***
(0.022) (0.022)
US Medical Degree -0.118*** -0.125***
(0.021) (0.024)
Affiliated to Teaching Hospital 0.086*** 0.114***
(0.020) (0.021)
Any Award or Publication 0.037 0.042*
(0.024) (0.023)
Speaks Spanish -0.067*** -0.071***
(0.021) (0.021)
Appointment Day of the Week Dummy x x
Appointment Time of the Day Dummy x x
Zip Level Variables x
Observations 200,123 200,123 200,123 200,123 200,123
No. of Physicians 397 397 397 397 397
LR chi2(1) 13 42 45 1197 1442
Prob > chi2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Pseudo R2 0.003 0.007 0.009 0.107 0.122
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Table 2.5: Regression Discontinuity Approach 
Dependent Variable = 1 (if an appointment is filled); 0 (if an appointment is open) 
Panel A: Bandwidth = 0.1 
 
Panel B: Bandwidth = 0.4 
 
Note: Numbers in bracket are standard errors clustered for physician IDs.  ***, **, * denote significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. All physicians with at least 5 reviews are included in the regression. 
Threshold dummy takes value 0 if the average rating falls below rounding threshold (so is rebounded down 
to a star), and value 1 if the average rating falls above rounding threshold (so is rebounded up to a star) The 
unit of observation is an appointment. Regressions include all observations within 0.1 (Panel A) and 0.4 
(Panel B) stars of a discontinuity.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Threshold Dummy 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.09** 0.09*** 0.11***
(0.037) (0.035) (0.034) (0.030) (0.030)
Avg. Overall Rating x x x x x
No. of Patient Reviews (Standardized~(0,1)) x x x x
Text Review Variables x x x
Physician Profile Variables x x
Appointment Day of the Week Dummy x x
Appointment Time of the Day Dummy x x
Zip Level Variables x
Observations 45,071 45,071 45,071 45,071 45,071
No. of Physicians 127 127 127 127 127
LR chi2(1) 9 25 33 428 492
Prob > chi2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Pseudo R2 0.010 0.024 0.029 0.142 0.169
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Threshold Dummy 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020)
Average Overall Rating x x x x x
No. of Patient Reviews (Standardized~(0,1)) x x x x
Text Review Variables x x x
Physician Profile Variables x x
Appointment Day of the Week Dummy x x
Appointment Time of the Day Dummy x x
Zip Level Variables x
Observations 155,338 155,338 155,338 155,338 155,338
No. of Physicians 308 308 308 308 308
LR chi2(1) 29 52 67 943 1009
Prob > chi2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Pseudo R2 0.010 0.017 0.020 0.117 0.140
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Table 2.6: McCrary Test for Quasi-Random Assignment 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the probability mass of observations in each 0.05 
rating interval. The treatment variable indicates intervals that are just above a 
rounding threshold. 
  
Treatment (0.05 star interval above rounding threshold) 0.018
(0.017)
Observations 33
Dependent Variable = Prob Mass of 0.05 Star Bin
74 
 
 
Table 2.7: OLS Regression for Speed of Filling Appointment Slot 
Dependent Variable: Number of days between the appointment date and the date the 
appointment got filled 
 
Note: Numbers in bracket are standard errors clustered for physician IDs. ***, **, * denote significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The unit of observation is an appointment that gets filled. Bad (Good) 
key words are expressed as percentage of total text review word count. Zip level demographic variables are 
from American Community Survey (2011). The zip level demographic variables included are Hispanic (%), 
White (%), Asian (%), Age 21-64 (%), Age 65+ (%), Works from Home (%), Median Household Income 
(Standardized~(0,1)), Married-Couple Families (%), Average Family Size, Bachelor Degree of Higher (%), 
and Same Residence as 1 year ago (%). 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Avg. Overall Rating 0.279*** 0.266*** 0.250*** 0.296*** 0.275***
(0.088) (0.091) (0.090) (0.074) (0.071)
No. Of Patient Reviews (Standardized~(0,1)) 0.027 0.029 -0.003 -0.038
(0.027) (0.027) (0.023) (0.025)
Text Review Variables
Bad Key Words (%) 0.014 -0.007 -0.031
(0.058) (0.052) (0.049)
Good Key Words (%) 0.006 0.013 0.006
(0.012) (0.010) (0.009)
Physician Profile Variables
Female 0.234*** 0.223***
(0.061) (0.061)
Us Medical Degree 0.057 -0.005
(0.060) (0.057)
Affiliated To Teaching Hospital 0.179*** 0.278***
(0.058) (0.059)
Any Award Or Publication 0.057 0.010
(0.063) (0.059)
Speaks Spanish -0.113* -0.119**
(0.060) (0.059)
Appointment Day of the Week Dummy x x
Appointment Time of the Day Dummy x x
Zip Level Variables x
Constant 1.050*** 1.109*** 1.137*** 0.551 0.783
(0.404) (0.414) (0.410) (0.339) (1.623)
Observations 90,420 90,420 90,420 90,420 90,420
No. of Physicians 395 395 395 395 395
Adj R2 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.094 0.109
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Table 2.8: Regression Discontinuity Approach for Speed of Filling Appointment 
Slot, Bandwidth= 0.1 
Dependent Variable: Number of days between the appointment date and the date the 
appointment got filled 
 
Note: Numbers in bracket are standard errors clustered for physician IDs. ***, **, * denote significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. All physicians with at least 5 reviews are included in the regression. 
Regressions include all observations within 0.1 stars of a discontinuity. Text Review variables included are 
negative and positive key words as percentage of total text review word count. Physician profile variables 
are the number of in-network insurance types, and dummies for female, US medical Degree, affiliated to a 
teaching hospital, and any award or publication. Appointment variables included are dummies for 
appointment day of the week (Monday through Friday), and appointment time of the day (i.e, dummies for 
<10am to 4-5pm). Zip level demographic variables are from American Community Survey (2011). The zip 
level demographic variables included are Hispanic (%), White (%), Asian (%), Age 21-64 (%), Age 65+ 
(%), Works from Home (%), Median Household Income (Standardized~(0,1)), Married-Couple Families 
(%), Average Family Size, Bachelor Degree of Higher (%), and Same Residence as 1 year ago (%). 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Threshold Dummy 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.16* 0.18**
(0.112) (0.111) (0.109) (0.082) (0.084)
Avg. Overall Rating x x x x x
No. of Patient Reviews x x x x
Text Review Variables x x x
Physician Profile Variables x x
Appointment Day of the Week Dummy x x
Appointment Time of the Day Dummy x x
Zip Level Variables x
Observations 18,866 18,866 18,866 18,866 18,866
No. of Physicians 123 123 123 123 123
Adj R2 0.002 0.002 0.010 0.117 0.146
  
 
7
6
 
7
6
 
Table 2.9: Supply of Appointments by the Physicians Based on the Probability of Filling Appointment in the Last 7 
Days 
Dependent Variable: Supply of Appointments as a Proportion of Avg. Supply in Last 7 Days 
 
Note: Numbers in bracket are standard errors clustered for physician IDs. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Avg. Prob. of Filling an Appointment in the Last 7 days 0.090*** 0.088*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.060*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.066***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Avg. Overall Rating 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.015
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
No. Of Patient Reviews (Standardized~(0,1)) 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Text Review Variables
Bad Key Words (%) 0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Good Key Words (%) 0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Physician Profile Variables
Female 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.009
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
US Medical Degree 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.020
(0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017)
Affiliated to Teaching Hospital -0.008 -0.005 -0.006 -0.003
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Any Award or Publication -0.006 -0.009 -0.007 -0.009
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Speaks Spanish -0.019 -0.020 -0.018 -0.019
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Appointment Day of the Week Dummy x x x x
Zip Level Variables x x
Constant 1.003*** 0.961*** 0.968*** 0.968*** 0.726*** 0.244 0.765*** 0.299
(0.012) (0.088) (0.088) (0.093) (0.093) (0.458) (0.031) (0.446)
Observations 11,524 11,524 11,524 11,524 11,524 11,524 11,524 11,524
No. of Physicians 397 397 397 397 397 397 397 397
Adj R2 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.035 0.036 0.035 0.036
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Table 2.10: Supply of Appointments by the Physicians Based on the Probability of Filling Appointment in the Last 14 
Days 
Dependent Variable: Supply of Appointments as a Proportion of Avg. Supply in Last 14 Days 
 
Note: Numbers in bracket are standard errors clustered for physician IDs. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Avg. Prob. of Filling an Appointment in the Last 14 days 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.064*** 0.038* 0.041* 0.039* 0.042*
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Avg. Overall Rating 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.011
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
No. Of Patient Reviews (Standardized~(0,1)) -0.004 -0.004 0.000 -0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Text Review Variables
Bad Key Words (%) 0.005 0.005 0.006
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Good Key Words (%) 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Physician Profile Variables
Female 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.003
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
US Medical Degree 0.011 0.009 0.013 0.010
(0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017)
Affiliated to Teaching Hospital -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.021
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Any Award or Publication -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Speaks Spanish -0.023 -0.022 -0.022 -0.021
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Appointment Day of the Week Dummy x x x x
Zip Level Variables x x
Constant 1.005*** 0.974*** 0.964*** 0.960*** 0.744*** 0.453 0.795*** 0.501
(0.013) (0.100) (0.101) (0.106) (0.106) (0.457) (0.031) (0.448)
Observations 10,245 10,245 10,245 10,245 10,245 10,245 10,245 10,245
No. of Physicians 397 397 397 397 397 397 397 397
Adj R2 0.00182 0.00176 0.00173 0.00167 0.0403 0.0406 0.0403 0.0405
78 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Search Volume for the term "Doctor Reviews" using Google Trends 
 
Figure 2.2: Search Volume for ZocDoc using Google Trends 
 
Figure 2.3: Search Volume for HealthGrades using Google Trends 
 
Note: Healthgrades.com is a consumer review website helping consumers to look for hospitals and doctors.   
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Figure 2.4: Search Volume for RateMds using Google Trends 
Note: RateMds.com is a consumer review website helping consumers to look for hospitals and doctors. 
Figure 2.5: Search Volume for Vitals using Google Trends 
Note: Vitals.com is a consumer review website helping consumers to look for hospitals and doctors. 
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Figure 2.6: www.ZocDoc.com Home Page 
 
Note: This figure shows the home page of www.ZocDoc.com. On this page the website enables patients to 
search for physicians by specialty, location, insurance, practice name, procedure, hospital, and language. 
The search related features of the webpage are encircled in red. 
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Figure 2.7: Physician Search Result: Physician and Appointment Options 
 
Note: The above figure shows the first four physicians from the list of primary care physicians, that is 
displayed after a search of primary care physician, in Manhattan. Physician’s address and rounded average 
ratings (stars) are prominently displayed next to his picture (see the section encircled in red ink for an 
example). More stars means higher rating of the physician. Also displayed are the appointment slots 
available during the current week. 
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Figure 2.8: A Typical Physician's Profile Page 
 
Note: This figure shows a typical doctor’s profile page. The rounded average rating are displayed next to 
his picture (encircled in red ink). Also displayed at the top of the page are the physician awards given by 
ZocDoc to inform the patients about the physician's strength on ZocDoc (encircled in red ink). These 
awards are explained in further detail in Table 6. The physician's specialty, practice name, education 
details, hospital affiliations, languages spoken, and a complete list of insurances accepted are also 
displayed. Details of each patient review—date, and patient name if disclosed by the patient— are also 
displayed (underlined in red ink). After the appointment a patient can rate the physician for overall rating, 
bedside manner, as well as wait time (section encircled in red). The patient can also leave a text review to 
describe their experience in detail. All this information is displayed on the physician's profile page. 
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Figure 2.9: An Example of Patient Reviews 
 
Note: This figure shows a snapshot of reviews for Dr. Ellen Mellow, MD. She is a primary care physician 
practicing in Manhattan. The figure shows the range of ratings and the detailed reviews left by patients. 
This webpage was accessed on October 14, 2013.  
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Figure 2.10: The Review Process 
 
Note: After the appointment ZocDoc emails a thank you note to the patient encouraging the patient to leave 
a feedback. The above figure shows the feedback page. The patient can rate the physician on a scale of 1-5 
under three categories—would you recommend this professional, bedside manner, and wait time (see 
underlined in red ink). ZocDoc also asks permission to use patient's name and appointment date in the 
review that will be displayed on the physician's webpage (see section encircled in red ink).   
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Figure 2.11: Distribution of Physicians (N=397) by their Average Overall Ratings 
 
 
Note: Figure 7 reports the distribution of physicians in our data by their average overall ratings, as of May 
11, 2013.  The figure is based on a distribution of ratings on the last day of our data collection exercise, the 
average rating for individual physicians does change over the course of our data collection, as new reviews 
are available, however the distribution of ratings on different days in our sample are quantitatively similar. 
The y axis is the percentage of physicians with a given rating. Thus a doctor that has 2 reviews and average 
rating of 4 has the same weight as another doctor that has 20 reviews with rating of 4. Therefore, in the 
sample around 18% of the doctors have a perfect rating of 5.   
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
 (
%
)
<3 3-3.9 4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 5
Rating Bins
Distribution of Physicians (N=397) by their Average Overall Ratings on 11 May
86 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Distribution of All Appointments (N=200,383) by Time of the Day 
Panel A: Distribution of All the posted Appointments by Time of the Day 
 
Panel B: Probability of Filling an Appointment by Time of the Day (Overall=45%)
 
Note: Panel A reports the distribution of all the listed appointments by the time of the day, for the period 
February 24, 2013 to May 11, 2013. Panel B reports the distribution of the probability of filling an 
appointment by the time of the day. 
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Figure 2.13: Distribution of Filled Appointments (N=90,539) by the Distance of 
Appointment Filled Date from the Appointment Date  
 
Note: This figure reports the distribution of distance in days of the appointment filled date from the 
appointment date. A distance of -1 implies that the appointment was filled within 24 hours of the 
appointment date. Overall, 45 percent of all appointments made available on ZocDoc during February 24, 
2013 to May 11, 2013 get filled. 
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Figure 2.14: Average Probability of Filling an Appointment by Physician's Average 
Overall Rating (Overall=45%), Binwidth = 0.1 
  
Note: Figure shows the distribution of the probability of filling an appointment (raw) by the physician's 
average overall rating, for the period February 24, 2013 to May 11, 2013. The vertical lines highlight the 
discontinuity points at 4.25 and 4.75 star ratings. 
 
 
2
5
3
5
4
5
5
5
6
5
7
5
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
F
ill
in
g
 a
n
 A
p
p
o
in
tm
e
n
t
4 4.25 4.5 4.75 5
Rating Bins
Probability averaged within 0.1 star bins
89 
 
 
Figure 2.15: Discontinuous Changes in Probability of Filling an Appointment 
Around the Discontinuity Points, Binwidth = 0.1
 
Note: The residuals are from a marginal probit regression with dependent Variable = 1 (if appointment 
filled); 0 (open appointments), based on regression (5) in table 4. All physicians with at least 5 reviews are 
included in the regression. The residuals are averaged within 0.1 star bins, 4.25 and 4.75 are the two 
discontinuity points. We see a sharp jump at 4.25 but not much effect at 4.75.  
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Figure 2.16: Discontinuous Changes in Probability of Filling an Appointment 
Around the Discontinuity Points, Binwidth = 0.05 
 
Note: The residuals are from a marginal probit regression with dependent Variable = 1 (if appointment 
filled); 0 (open appointments), based on regression (5) in table 4. All physicians with at least 5 reviews are 
included in the regression. The residuals are averaged within 0.05 star bins, 4.25 and 4.75 are the two 
discontinuity points. We see a sharp jump at 4.25 but not much effect at 4.75. The figure also shows 99% 
bootstrapped confidence intervals. Local polynomial regression is used to fit the smooth lines.     
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3. Does Cost-Sharing Affect Response to Signals? The Effect of Bad 
News on Utilization of Prescription Drugs with Cost-Sharing 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Rising costs of prescription drugs have increasingly led the employers, and 
insurers to design pharmaceutical benefit plans with greater consumer cost sharing, for 
certain drugs, to encourage the purchase of lower cost drugs, and therefore bring down 
overall prescription drug spending. Evaluations of such plans suggest that increased cost 
sharing has had the intended impact of reducing consumer spending on prescription 
drugs. However, it is not clear how cost-sharing will affect consumer response to new 
information related to the effectiveness of the drug. The pharmaceutical market is 
constantly flooded with new information. New drug related information—positive or 
negative—often starts emerging after a drug's approval. On the negative side it could be 
release of research results pointing to toxicity or other problems, leading in some cases, 
to Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) drug risk communication such as a black box 
warning. The impact of such information is complicated due to the presence of different 
levels of cost-sharing. This chapter examines the joint effect of negative information and 
consumer cost-sharing on the consumption of prescription drugs.  
The impact of co-payment on patient behavior is very well researched. Dor and 
Encinosa (2010), study the impact of cost sharing on drug utilization in patients suffering 
from diabetes, and find that increased cost-sharing results in lower rates of compliance 
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(refilling the prescription) and higher rates of non-compliance regardless of the cost-
sharing mechanism. Further, the negative effects of cost-sharing on non-compliance are 
larger in the coinsurance regime than in the copayment regime. Gibson et al. (2005) also 
report that the higher level of prescription drug sharing does not always lead to patients 
switching to generic drugs. Dana et al. (2009) report that the patient response to increase 
in copayment varies with the type of drug. They find that the patients are most sensitive 
to price change to drugs that they are taking for a long term. However, Crown et al. 
(2004) find no statistically significant relationship between out-of-pocket copayments 
and asthma treatment patterns; they use Marketscan 1995-2000 data for their analysis.  
There also exists a large body of literature which studies the impact of drug risk 
communication on drug utilization. Drug utilization after a safety communication is 
influenced by the type of advisory, the drug's therapy class, and the presence or absence 
of alternatives for that drug. It is also influenced by FDA's efforts in educating the 
physicians and patients regarding the drug's adverse reaction, physician's prescribing 
behavior and out-of-pocket payment for that drug. Dusetzina et al. (2012) study the 
impact of FDA drug communications on drug utilizations. They find that specific 
warnings—focusing on a single drug, or targeting a specific population, or risk—are 
more effective than general warnings, for example, greater monitoring for the drug. The 
presence of acceptable alternatives, and repeated reinforcing of the message over time by 
FDA also increases the effectiveness of the warning. Wagner et al. (2006) find that the 
response of physicians to a boxed warning can be inadequate, risking the health of their 
patients by exposing them to potentially unsafe drugs.  
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There exit countless studies on the impact of warnings on drug utilization 
however, there is a lack of research on how out-of-pocket may play into this scenario. 
Does cost-sharing affect a consumer's response to drug risk communication or the 
response to a severe drug risk communication is swift and not responsive to cost sharing. 
In this chapter I examine this question, specifically I will look into the joint effect of 
FDA's drug risk communication and consumer cost-sharing on the consumption of 
prescription drugs. This chapter is organized in the following way. Section 3.2 describes 
the data used in the chapter, while the empirical strategy is outlined in section 3.3. section 
3.4 reports the regression results and section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2. Data  
In this paper I use MarketScan® Commercial Claims and Encounter Database 
which is a database on actively employed individuals and their dependents who are 
covered by employer-sponsored plans, early retirees, and individuals insured through 
COBRA continuation health coverage. The database captures individual level utilization 
of inpatient and outpatient services including prescription drug claims, individual and 
claims specific diagnosis and expenditures for these services, and detailed enrollment and 
demographic information for each individual. Patient information is linked to claims and 
encounter data across types of providers, and over time.  
For purposes of this paper, I use four different files belonging to the 
MarketScan® 2010 database. These are 1) Inpatient Admissions Table, 2) The Outpatient 
Pharmaceutical Table, 3) Enrollment Detail Table, 4) 2010 Redbook. The Inpatient 
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Admissions Table contains information about a hospital admission summarized from all 
of the claims—from hospitals, physicians, surgeons and labs—associated with an 
admission. The Outpatient Pharmaceutical Claims Table contains insurance drug 
claims—mail order or card program—for all individuals who purchased prescription 
drugs. The Enrollment Table contains individual level demographic, enrollment and plan 
information. The Outpatient Pharmaceutical Table, the Inpatient Admissions Table, and 
the Enrollment Detail are linked to each other by the variable ENROLID which is unique 
for each individual. The Red Book is linkable to the Prescription Drug Claims Table 
through National Drug Code and provides information about prescription drugs, such as 
generic name, manufacturer, therapeutic class, etc.  
FDA's drug safety communication data is collected from FDA website which 
maintains up-to-date information for consumers and health care practitioners on drug 
safety investigations, evaluations and drug warnings. Depending upon the seriousness of 
the adverse reaction report, a drug safety investigation can result in a boxed warning on 
product labeling, recall of the drug from the market, or addition of the concerns to the 
"Warnings and Precautions" section. From the FDA website I identify four prescription 
drugs, with a drug safety communication in 2010, and which are prescribed for chronic 
conditions. These are cholesterol-lowering medication, Zocor, type 2 diabetes mellitus 
medications, Avandia, and Actos, and the anti-blood clotting medication, Plavix, which is 
prescribed to patients with cardiovascular disease to reduce the chance of heart attack, 
and cardiovascular death among them. FDA added a boxed warning for Plavix in 2010 
implying a serious adverse reaction calling for an evaluation of its risks versus benefits 
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while prescribing. In the case of Zocor, FDA safety communication informed the public 
about an increased risk of muscle injury in patients taking its highest approved dose. The 
FDA communication regarding Avandia stated that the FDA is reviewing the 
cardiovascular risks associated with its intake based on data from a large, long-term 
clinical study that concluded in August 2009. In the case of Actos the communication 
informed about reviewing data from an ongoing, ten-year epidemiological study designed 
to evaluate whether it is associated with an increased risk of bladder cancer.  
It must be noted that these drugs have different types of safety communication in 
terms of the seriousness of the adverse reaction due to the drugs intake. In the case for 
Plavix the investigation was concluded by the date of the safety communication and the 
evidence was clear enough to issue a boxed warning. In the case of Zocor there is a clear 
evidence of increased risk of muscle injury with the intake of the highest dose, however, 
the adverse reaction is not serious enough for the FDA to issue a black box warning. In 
the case of Avandia and Actos, the safety communication informs about the release of the 
results from clinical trials evaluating their safety in near future. Table 3.1 lists these 
drugs, their generic compound, the date of the FDA drug risk communication, the 
therapeutic class to which these drugs belong, and the other drugs in the same therapy 
class which can possibly substitute for the drug for which FDA has released a safety 
communication.  
For my analysis I focus on adults over the age of eighteen, who are continuously 
enrolled in 2010 with prescription drug coverage. I track those individuals, who have at 
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least one purchase of any of the four drugs—Plavix, Zocor, Avandia, Actos (or their 
substitutes as identified in table 3.1) —before the date of the drug risk communication. I 
track only those individuals with at least a 30 day drug supply purchase, of either of these 
drugs, before the drug safety communication was announced. This exercise gives me 
174,794 individuals purchasing any of the four drugs with safety warning on them. I track 
compliance within a 90 day interval after the drug safety communication. Non-Compliant 
individuals are those that do not refill or buy another drug in the class. Table 3.2 reports 
the market share of the drugs, within a therapy class, for the period, before the date of the 
safety communication and after that date for the remaining period of 2010. For example, 
Plavix's market share drops from 91 percent before the safety warning to 89 percent after 
the safety warning. The table also states the compliance rate for individuals who were 
consuming these drugs before the safety warning. For example, the compliance rate for 
Plavix after the boxed warning is 55 percent. The table also notes the compliance rates 
for other drugs in the same therapy class. The compliance rate, after the warning, for 
individuals consuming other drugs in the same therapy class as Plavix is 49 percent. The 
average out-of-pocket for each drug and the drugs that can be found in the same therapy 
class is also noted in Table 3.2. There is a huge gap in the average out-of-pocket between 
Zocor ($ 9) and the drugs in the same therapy class ($ 35) . If we look at Avandia, and 
Actos the market share decreased after the warning and the compliance rate is in the 
neighborhood of 55 percent.  
Table 3.4 reports the summary statistics on the variables that I constructed for my 
analysis. I control for patient heterogeneity using age, sex, and chronic conditions 
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suffered by patients. These chronic conditions, 28 in total, were obtained from the 
Hospital Inpatient file of the MarketScan data using the AHRQ Comorbidity Software. 
Patients suffering from with multiple chronic conditions are prescribed several 
medicines, many of them expensive and can have difficulty complying with their 
prescriptions due to budget constraints or simply due to forgetfulness or procrastination. 
From among the 28 chronic conditions, I control for congestive heart failure, pulmonary 
circulation disease, renal failure, as well as for obesity. I also include a dummy variable 
which is turned on if a patient is suffering from four or more chronic conditions. I also 
include a dummy if the patient is a dependent, that is, the patient is not the primary 
insurance policy holder. In my regression I also control for different age categories, and 
geographic regions. 
3.3. Empirical Strategy 
The theoretical underpinning of our estimation strategy is based on 
pharmaceutical demand theory developed in Ma and Riordan (2002), and Dor and 
Encinosa (2010). In this framework a continuum of individuals, with a unique level of 
sickness s distributed on [0,1], have increasing, concave or linear utility function U and 
income y. The decision not to refill a prescription results in loss of health that is a 
function of sickness, (L(s)). The out-of-pocket cost of filling a prescription is c. Dor and 
Encinosa (2010) find that sicker patient are less likely to refill because they have to exert 
higher effort (e(s)) to fill prescription.  
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The impact of negative information on the drug, in the form of FDA warning, is 
to reduce the value that patients place on the drug. I define that the net value that the 
patient places on the drug to be V(s,n) - L(s). Where, V(s,n) is the gross value that the 
patient places on a drug which is a function of sickness (s) and the relevant FDA safety 
information (n). The patient will comply and refill if the utility from refill is higher than 
that from non-compliance i.e., U(y + V(s,n) - e(s) - L(s) - c) > U(y - L(s)), which implies 
c < V(s,n) - e(s). Thus a patient will be compliant if the cost of filling a prescription is 
less than the value she places on the drug, net of the effort of refilling it. While 
comparing two drugs with similar costs, the one with negative safety information should 
have a lower compliance rate.  
To identify the effect of drug warning and out-of-pocket payment, I estimate the 
following model. For patient  ,  
                                     
       
      
     
                                                      
                                                  
  
     is the average out of pocket cost for patient   
    is a dummy variable, which is turned on if the drug used by patient   has an 
FDA warning. 
       is the interaction term for     and    
    
  are the set of demographic variables, like gender, age, region indictors etc.  
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    
  are the variables that capture the health specific information, like a dummy for 
4 or more chronic conditions etc. 
I run separate regression for the four drugs covered in this chapter. The variables 
of interest are the dummy variable for drug with safety communication, and the 
interaction term for out of pocket cost and the dummy variable for drug with safety 
communication. Our hypothesis is that while bad news reduces probability of 
compliance, the effect is stronger for patients with higher out-of-pocket expenses. 
3.4. Results 
Regression results are reported in tables 3.4 to 3.6. I report marginal effects from 
a simple probit regression, where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the patient is 
compliant and is equal to 0 otherwise.
20
 The standard errors in parentheses are corrected 
for clustering at the health insurance level. Table 3.4 reports the results for Zocor, 3.5 for 
Plavix, 3.6 for Avandia, and 3.7 for Actos.
21
 Each table reports results for six different 
regression specifications. The first two specifications do not have the dummy variable for 
drug news      and the interaction term for out of pocket cost and the drug news. 
Specification six has all the variables, including the coinsurance dummy to capture the 
difference in compliance behavior of copayment versus coinsurance plans, see Dor and 
Encinosa (2010). 
                                                 
20
 Dor and Encinosa (2010) distinguish between full and partial compliance based on full or partial refill of 
the prescription. We combine the two and describe a patient in compliance even if the patient goes for a 
partial refill.  
21
 While the region indicators (North East, South, West) are included in the regression, for the sake of 
brevity we do not report the estimated coefficients. 
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For all the four drug types, I consistently find that the out-of-pocket cost reduces 
compliance rate, the effect is statistically significant for antihyperlipidemic (Table 3.4), 
antiplatelet agents (Table 3.5), and antidiabetic agents (Table 3.7). Consistent with Dor 
and Encinosa (2010), I find that compliance rate is negatively impacted by the overall 
health condition of the patient. The dummy variable capturing 4 or more chronic 
conditions is statistically significantly negative for all the commodity sets and all the 
regression specifications. I do not find coinsurance dummy variable to be significant.  
In order to investigate the impact of bad news on compliance I will focus on 
regression specification three to six. Specifications three and four include dummy 
variable for drug news, where the dummy variable is turned on if the patient was using 
the drug regarding which subsequently safety warning was announced. For three out of 
the four drugs—Zocor, Avandia, and Actos—I find statistically significant negative 
impact of FDA warning on compliance rate. Probability of compliance for Actos users 
reduced by 1%, for Zocor users it reduces by 4%, while for Avandia the corresponding 
number is 9%. The exception is Plavix, where the regression coefficient is significant but 
positive. It must be noted that as shown in Table 4.2, Plavix is also the only drug that has 
a higher average compliance rate than its competitors.   
The interaction term for out of pocket cost and the drug news (regression 
specification 5 and 6), is statistically significantly negative for all the four dug types. 
Indicating that compliance rate is much lower with higher out of pocket payment for the 
users of the drugs that have safety warning. 
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3.5. Discussion 
Given different levels of cost sharing, I should expect the consumer response to 
any negative information regarding a particular drug to be slower at lower levels of cost-
sharing. However, as a competing hypothesis one would expect that the response to a 
severe drug risk communication to be swift and not responsive to cost sharing. The 
evidence on the impact of publicity and direct-to-consumer advertisement on prescription 
drug demand has found that not all forms of publicity are equal. This paper extends this 
line of research by examining how different levels of cost-sharing and drug risk 
communication interact to influence consumer response. We find that higher cost sharing 
indeed has a significant impact of how patients respond to drug risk communication. We 
show that the higher cost sharing combined with drug risk communication reduces the 
compliance rate, probability of refilling a prescription.   
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Table 3.1: Sample of Drugs and the FDA warnings, 2010 
  1 2 3 4 
Drug Name Zocor Plavix Avandia Actos 
Generic 
Component 
Simvastatin Clopidogrel Rosiglitazone Pioglitazone 
Therapeutic 
Class 
Antihyperlipidemic Antiplatelet 
Agents 
Antidiabetic 
Agents 
Antidiabetic 
Agents 
Date of Warning March 19,2010 March 
12,2010 
February 
2,2010 
Spetember 
19,2010 
Other Drugs in 
the Therapeutic 
Class 
Lovastatin, 
Pravastatin Sodium, 
Atorvastatin, 
Fenofibrate, 
Cerivastatin, 
Gemfibrozil, 
Ezetimibe 
Dipyridamole, 
Prasugrel, 
Ticlopidine, 
Cilostazol, 
Anagrelide 
Pioglitazone, 
Metformin, 
Sitagliptin, 
Glimepiride, 
Glibenclamide 
Rosiglitazone, 
Metformin, 
Sitagliptin, 
Glimepiride, 
Glibenclamide 
Type of Safety 
Communication 
Ongoing safety 
review, increased 
risk of muscle injury 
Boxed 
Warning, 
Reduced 
effectiveness 
Ongoing 
review, 
cardiovascular 
safety 
Ongoing 
Safety 
Review, 
Potential 
Increased Risk 
of Bladder 
Cancer 
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Table 3.2: Drug use summary 
  1 2 2 3 
Name of Drug Zocor 
(Simvastatin) 
Plavix 
(Clopidogrel) 
Avandia 
(Rosiglitazone) 
Actos 
(Pioglitazone) 
Market Share 
before the event 
32.7 91.4 2.3 13.7 
Average out-of-
pocket 
9.1 45.1 41.6 39.8 
Market Share 
after the event 
33.3 88.9 1.4 13.2 
Compliance Rate 51.9 55.2 55.7 58.3 
Average out-of-
pocket for drugs 
in the same 
therapy class 
35.0 32.3 21.1 17.3 
Compliance Rate 
for drugs in the 
same therapy 
class 
53.0 49.3 64.3 58.4 
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics Market Scan Data Coverage 2010 
Persons=174794, Claims = 759997 
    Mean Std. Dev 
Age 52.89 8.56 
Females % 0.47  
Dependent % 0.33  
Four or More Chronic Conditions % 0.20  
Diabetes % 0.54  
Cholesterol %  0.64  
Obesity % 0.16  
Pulmonary Circulation Disease % 0.02  
Renal Failure % 0.06  
Congestive Heart Failure % 0.04  
North East % 0.13  
North Central % 0.30  
South % 0.41  
West % 0.16  
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Table 3.4: Probit marginal effect estimates of compliance: Zocor (Simvastatin) 
Independent 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Average Out-of-
Pocket -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.032*** -0.039*** -0.030** -0.030** 
  (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) 
Average Out-of-
Pocket Squared   0.000   0.001 0.000 0.000 
    (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Zocor     -0.040*** -0.043** 0.009 0.009 
      (0.014) (0.018) (0.007) (0.007) 
(Average Out-of-
Pocket) x Zocor         -0.141*** -0.141*** 
          (0.029) (0.029) 
Coinsurance           0.005 
            (0.013) 
Age 35 - 44 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age 45 - 54 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age 55+ 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Female -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Dependent -0.006** -0.006** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
4 or more chronic 
conditions -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.063*** 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Cardiac -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Pulmonary -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Kidney 0.017* 0.017* 0.017* 0.017* 0.017* 0.017* 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Obese 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Observations 1,034,466 1,034,466 1,034,466 1,034,466 1,034,466 1,034,466 
LR (Prob > chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.008 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the health insurance level. 
Three region indicators are not shown. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.5: Probit marginal effect estimates of compliance: Plavix (Clopidogrel) 
Independent 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Average Out-of-
Pocket -0.022*** -0.025** -0.023*** -0.027*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
  (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) 
Average Out-of-
Pocket Squared   0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 
    (0.001)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Plavix     0.069*** 0.070*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 
      (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) 
(Average Out-of-
Pocket) x Plavix         -0.016** -0.016** 
          (0.007) (0.007) 
Coinsurance           0.018 
            (0.022) 
Age 35 - 44 0.026* 0.026* 0.024* 0.023* 0.023* 0.024* 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Age 45 - 54 0.020 0.020 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.017 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Age 55+ 0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Female -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Dependent -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
4 or more chronic 
conditions -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.083*** 
  (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
Cardiac -0.019 -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Pulmonary -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
Kidney -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Obese 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Observations 66,117 66,117 66,117 66,117 66,117 66,117 
LR (Prob > chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, are corrected for clustering at the health insurance level. 
Three region indicators are not shown. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.6: Probit marginal effect estimates of compliance: Avandia (Rosiglitazone) 
Independent 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Average Out-of-
Pocket -0.006 -0.002 -0.005 0.000 0.001 0.001 
  (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Average Out-of-
Pocket Squared   -0.000   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
    (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Avandia     -0.091*** -0.093*** -0.075*** -0.075*** 
      (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) 
(Average Out-of-
Pocket) x Avandia         -0.012** -0.012** 
          (0.006) (0.006) 
Coinsurance           0.019* 
            (0.010) 
Age 35 - 44 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age 45 - 54 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age 55+ 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.088*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Female -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Dependent -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
4 or more chronic 
conditions -0.059*** -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.058*** 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Cardiac 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Pulmonary 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Kidney -0.057*** -0.059*** -0.056*** -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.057*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Obese -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Observations 159,068 159,068 159,068 159,068 159,068 159,068 
LR (Prob > chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, are corrected for clustering at the health insurance 
level. Three region indicators are not shown. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.7: Probit marginal effect estimates of compliance: Actos (Pioglitazone) 
Independent 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Average Out-of-
Pocket -0.009*** -0.007 -0.008** -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Average Out-of-
Pocket Squared   -0.000   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
    (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Actos     -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.007 -0.007 
      (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
(Average Out-of-
Pocket) x Actos         -0.007*** -0.007*** 
          (0.002) (0.002) 
Coinsurance           0.025*** 
            (0.008) 
Age 35 - 44 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age 45 - 54 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.178*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age 55+ 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.205*** 0.205*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Female -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Dependent -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
4 or more chronic 
conditions -0.099*** -0.099*** -0.099*** -0.099*** -0.099*** -0.098*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Cardiac -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.059*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Pulmonary -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Kidney -0.098*** -0.099*** -0.097*** -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.098*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Obese -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 815,100 815,100 815,100 815,100 815,100 815,100 
LR (Prob > chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, are corrected for clustering at the health insurance level. 
Three region indicators are not shown. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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